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2 Abstract 
Abstract 
Outbreaks of novel influenza viruses are continually occurring on many places on our planet, 
with the ultimate and most extreme consequence being a full-scale pandemic. Modern 
communication technology is widely used for risk communication regarding recommended 
change in behavior patterns and other precautions in order to mitigate the transmission. 
However, the assumption and bias that modern communication technology constitutes the 
norm causes vulnerable groups to be at possible risk of systematic exclusion to correct and 
updated information. Through conducting a literature- and case analysis, the aim of this study 
is to identify insufficient or inadequate risk communication efforts in South Korea and Vietnam 
during influenza outbreaks, especially with concern of vulnerable groups. Further, to analyze 
how national influenza preparedness plans observe or ignore these insufficiencies. Results 
show that vulnerable groups are explicitly recognized in the preparedness plan of Vietnam. 
However, the South Korean preparedness plan show a more homogenous approach. Both South 
Korea and Vietnam showed a broad variety of channels used in their risk communication 
strategies which could be positive in terms of a broad outreach to a heterogenous population, 
including vulnerable groups. Four key factors that moderate the outcomes of risk 
communication were identified: Channels, Messages, Transparency and Trust.  
Keywords 
Information and communication technology, Epidemic, Pandemic, Communication 
inequalities, Public health emergency preparedness, Digital divide, Risk communication, 
Preparedness strategies, Communication strategies 
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6 Introduction 
Introduction 
The ultimate job of risk communication is to try to produce a citizenry that has the 
knowledge, the power, and the will to assess its own risks rationally, decide which ones it 
wants to tolerate and which ones it wants to reduce or eliminate, and act accordingly. 
(Sandman 1993, p.82) 
 
The idea of this thesis arose in the light of the ongoing covid-19 pandemic, as the current events 
made it very clear how important it is to be reached by the latest information. This in order to 
adapt our behavior in our everyday lives to prevent further transmission. Globalization causes 
the problem to grow even bigger, because of the rapid spread of the virus through transnational 
movement. Our globalized and interconnected world makes today's pandemic not only a public 
health issue, but also a severe economic issue as trade patterns are profoundly disrupted. In the 
middle ages, it took 2050 years for smallpox to spread from Egypt to Europe as nations were 
more isolated from each other and transportation possibilities were more limited (Nye & Welch 
2013, p. 256). In comparison, a major advantage for humans today, lacking our ancestors in 
the past are new technologies such as communication equipment. However, information 
regarding regulations and guidelines in order to reduce the number of cases do not always reach 
all members of the population effectively, neither is compliance in alignment with the 
information equal among the population (Vaughan & Tinker 2009, p.325). 
Information inequalities is a development issue caused by different factors and ranges 
from lack of access to information and communication technology (ICT), also known as digital 
divide to lack of risk information in diverse languages. Digital divide is recognized as an 
obstacle towards equal development by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 
2020). According to the international telecommunications union ITU, 4.1 billion people, or 
53.6% of the world's population had access to the internet in 2019 (ITU 2020b). This means in 
turn, that approximately 4 billion people lack access, whereof 90% in the developing world. 
The aim to bridge the digital divide is part of the Sustainable Development Goal 9 and 
highlighted as crucial to equal access to information and knowledge (UNDP 2020). These 
inequalities and inefficient risk communication strategies could hinder individuals to act 
correctly in order to shield themselves from infection. This increases the risk of transmission 
among the vulnerable groups, which in turn is an obstacle for the entire community to combat 
rapid transmission (Vaughan & Tinker 2009, p. 324). In this study and this context, vulnerable 
groups will be those with low socioeconomic status (SES) and a limited access to technology 
(Hammond 1996, p.196). To study the gaps and weaknesses of risk communication during an 
epidemic is important, partly to highlight vulnerable groups in the context but also to highlight 
inequalities that jeopardize the health of individuals and the society, as well as equal 
development possibilities. 
 
ICT solutions have tremendous potential to change the way the world works, lives and 
interacts and thereby accelerate achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.  
(Nethope 2015, p.61) 
 
Communication possibilities for all are a vital part on the path towards sustainable 
development. Through new technologies, transparency and accountability can be fostered as 
well as empowering people to engage, interact and stay informed anywhere at any time 
(Nethope 2015, p.17). Mobile devices are one of the most important technologies to reach 
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isolated or poor communities with vital information that can improve their quality of life and 
capacitate them to make informed choices, as well as giving them a voice, access to health care, 
public services and education (ibid, p.26). A technical revolution has taken place, for example 
within disaster relief by enabling impacted populations to rapidly communicate their needs and 
the situation on the ground (ibid, p.41). Trends are showing an increase in global connectivity 
which looks promising, but there is still a long way to go (ibid, p.29). Challenges such as access 
to electricity and connectivity, leaving the unconnected behind, government attempts to control 
anti-government information and quick validation of information in case of emergency (ibid, 
p.18 & 42). Also, technology solutions need to be adapted to the context, strategic partnerships 
need to be formed and costs needs to be lower (ibid, p.16). Digital literacy needs to be enhanced 
and cultural barriers needs to be conquered (for example that women are less likely to own a 
mobile device than a man) (ibid, p.27). With the great threat to development that pandemics 
and epidemics poses in relation to the power that can be created through robust and reliable 
communication possibilities, this field remain a central and necessary process to study to assess 
its impact and function. 
Problem statement, purpose & research questions  
Problem statement  
Outbreaks of novel influenza viruses are continually occurring on many places on our planet, 
with the ultimate and most extreme consequence being a full-scale pandemic. This, even 
though knowledge about transmission patterns often are scientifically well established. Modern 
communication technology is widely used for risk communication regarding recommended 
change in behavior patterns and other precautions in order to mitigate the transmission in an 
event of an outbreak. However, the assumption and bias that modern communication 
technology constitutes the norm causes vulnerable groups to be at possible risk of systematic 
exclusion to correct and updated information. 
Purpose & Research questions 
The aim of this study is to identify insufficient or inadequate risk communication efforts during 
an influenza outbreak, especially with concern of vulnerable groups. Further, to analyze how 
national influenza preparedness plans observe or ignore these insufficiencies. Hence, asking 
the following research questions; 
● What strategies on how to reach vulnerable groups by risk communication are included 
in the national influenza preparedness plans, and ultimately in the national response to 
an influenza outbreak?  
● Which key factors determine the success or failure of risk communication efforts in 
pandemic influenza preparedness plans? 
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The Context 
Risk communication is one component of many in the establishment of an Emergency Risk 
Management for Health (ERMH). The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends 
governments to use these guidelines in their establishment and implementation of national 
emergency risk strategies (WHO 2017c, p.19). The government has the comprehensive 
responsibility in coordinating crisis preparedness plans and executing these if needed. 
Regarding national pandemic influenza risk management, they are the natural leaders for 
overall pandemic coordination and communication efforts. The efforts included in risk 
management are supported by WHO and other UN organizations under the law of International 
Health Regulations (IHR). The purpose the IHR (2005) is “to prevent, protect against, control 
and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are 
commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary 
interference with international traffic and trade” (WHO 2005a, p.1). Pandemic risk 
management requires close collaboration between all ministries within the government, not 
least the ministries of communication (WHO 2017c, p.56-57).  
WHO illustrates the importance of correct communication between authorities and the 
public during an event of an epidemic or pandemic. This was based on the experience of the 
influenza A(H1N1) 2009 pandemic where several member states experienced challenges 
related to communication (WHO 2017c, p.8). Well planned communication is crucial in the 
implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions, both on a personal and community level 
such as self-isolation, shut down of schools, etc. (WHO 2018a, p.25-26). 
Moreover, WHO emphasizes that populations are not homogeneous, and that risk 
communication needs to be diversified to reach everyone in society. It is important to develop 
effective strategies to inform, educate and communicate with vulnerable groups to improve 
their ability to take appropriate actions before, during and after a pandemic. It could be 
necessary to identify appropriate spokespeople, identify communication channels and assess 
their ability to reach all target population groups (WHO 2017c, p.35). If the heterogeneity in 
society are ignored in the risk communication strategies, current communication gaps for 
vulnerable populations could result in unequal protection across society during an influenza 
pandemic. Strategic planning should therefore fully consider how life circumstances, cultural 
values, and perspectives on risk, influence behavior during an outbreak (Vaughan & Tinker 
2009, p.324).  
The role of communication and equality 
The Swedish Program for Information and Communication Technologies in Developing 
Regions (SPIDER) concludes that an information gap is causing large problems as well as lack 
of access to reliable information in local languages. This through working with local 
organizations and organizing focus groups to curb the HIV/AIDS epidemic in southern Africa 
in the beginning of the 2000’s. The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 
leading the global work for the fight against the AIDS epidemic lists access to information as 
one of the top 10 priorities to mitigate spread of infectious disease (UNAIDS 2006). New 
information technology presents challenges for stakeholders to structure and evaluate 
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information, as it now is accessible from multiple sources, but also presents a variation of new 
opportunities (Cairns, de Andrade & MacDonald 2013, p.1551). 
Olofsson and Öhman emphasize that communication is essential for risk management, 
“risk communication can be seen as a collective name for all types of information and 
communication about potential risks that occur before, during and after a crisis or disaster”. 
The need for information increases fast during a crisis and lack of information is often what 
people point out as a major problem when the crisis is over (Olofsson & Öhman 2009, p.70). 
Epidemics & pandemics   
Novel virus outbreaks can escalate and become epidemics or in the worst-case scenario a 
pandemic such as the contemporary covid-19. However, from a national point of view a 
pandemic and an epidemic are very similar and thereby needs similar strategies to overcome. 
The biggest difference on a national level between an epidemic and a pandemic is the possible 
lack of humanitarian aid and international cooperation because of depleted stocks of 
equipment, medicine and resources. The World Health Organization has outlined pandemic 
influenza phases in order to illustrate and clarify the patterns of transmission, as well as 
guidance on appropriate actions in order to minimize severe outcomes (WHO 2020e). 
 
Figure 1. Pandemic Influenza Phases  
Adapted from: WHO (2020e)  
“The Avian Influenza” A/H5N1 outbreaks 2003  
Birds are natural hosts to the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses (HPAIV’s). This 
virus strain was first isolated in Guangdong, China in 1996 and have spread from southern 
China across Southeast, East and Central Asia, to the Middle East, Europe and Africa with a 
larger outbreak 2003/2004 in South-East Asia. Millions of domestic and wild birds have either 
died or been culled because of the outbreaks caused by H5N1 viruses. Transmission of H5N1 
HPAIV’s from birds to humans and human-to-human is rare, but if an infection occurs the 
mortality rate can be as high as 60% (Carrel et al. 2010, p.1). Normally by individuals coming 
in contact with raw infected poultry, eggs or excrements. It can also be transferred from other 
domestic animals such as cats, even though not equally common and therefore not considered 
a large risk in comparison with non-hygienic slaughter or cooking practices and insufficient 
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distancing of infected animals and humans. Birds in the wild can be unharmed reservoirs of 
influenza A strains that severely affect domestic poultry. This especially by the Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) with mortality up to 100% in poultry. Causing rapid spread 
within the flock, posing a great threat also adding the increasing risk of animal-human 
transmission in crowded living conditions (WHO 2020c). Avian Influenza have recurred 
several times since 2003, for example another avian influenza virus strain, H7N9, appeared in 
2013-2014 killing 175 people of a total 453 infected (Wallace & Ràfols 2018, p.1977). A risk 
scenario would be a combination of H5N1 “avian flu” strains and other virus strains, like H1N1 
“swine flu”, which could possibly lead to a human-to-human rapidly spreading disease with 
high mortality (Carrel et al. 2010, p.1). This is the main driver behind large efforts to obstruct 
infection pathways and to continually monitor outbreaks among poultry populations, the 
avoidance of mutation and thereby a possible pandemic (WHO 2020c). 
“The Swine flu” A/H1N1 pandemic 2009  
The first case of infection by the novel A/H1N1 virus in humans occurred in Mexico March 
18th, 2009 and increased rapidly (WHO 2009). The influenza was declared as a pandemic June 
11th, 2009 (Chan 2009). By August 10th, 2010 WHO Director-General Dr Margaret Chan 
announced that the A/H1N1 influenza virus has moved into the post-pandemic period (WHO 
2010), see Figure 1. The pandemic A/H1N1 caused more than 18000 laboratory confirmed 
deaths in more than 200 countries (Nguyen et al. 2015, p.216) The virus had not been 
previously detected in pigs or humans (WHO 2009) but are similar to the virus causing the 
Spanish flu in 1918. The estimated incidence of novel influenza A/H1N1 during the pandemic 
was 5.68/100 of all reported cases with a higher incidence rate in younger age groups. The 
virus caused a high morbidity and the mortality rate varied between 0.33-1.31% during the 
pandemic. Fatal cases were much more likely to occur in elderly, over 60 years of age (Choi et 
al. 2012, p.1).   
The A/H1N1 virus was first referred to as “the swine flu” by health officials but caused 
many misconceptions about the danger posed by pigs, like eating pork (Lin et al. 2014b). As 
the A/H1N1 virus from 2009 is now declared as a regular human flu virus and continues to 
circulate seasonally worldwide. The name of the virus has changed in order to minimize 
confusion and to differentiate the virus from the old seasonal A(H1N1) viruses circulating in 
humans before the pandemic (H1N1) 2009.The Advisers to the WHO Consultation on the 
Composition of Influenza Vaccines for the Southern Hemisphere 2012 advise WHO to use the 
nomenclature A(H1N1)pdm09 (WHO 2011). 
“Middle East Respiratory Syndrome” MERS outbreak 2013 - 2015  
The first known case of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was 
identified 2012 in Saudi Arabia and caused a big outbreak on the Arabian Peninsula. The largest 
outbreak outside the Arabian Peninsula occurred 2015 in South Korea (WHO 2018b). 
Dromedary camels are known to be the natural host to the MERS virus, but it is unknown how 
easily the virus transmits to humans. The most common way of transmission is human-to-
human, through droplets and close contact. The morbidity can vary but the mortality rate is 
high, approximately 35% (ibid). At the end of January 2020, a total of 2519 laboratory-
confirmed cases of MERS, including 866 associated deaths were reported globally (WHO 
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2020d). Human cases of the virus have been reported in 27 countries since 2012, whereof 80% 
from Saudi Arabia (WHO 2018b).    
“COVID-19” SARS-CoV-2 pandemic 2019 - ongoing  
Many facts regarding the novel coronavirus Covid-19 are - at the time of writing - still 
unknown. What is known is that it is a zoonotic virus, believed to be spread to humans from 
live animals on a food market in Wuhan, China in December 2019 (Peeri et al. 2020, p.2).  
Previously known as the “2019 novel coronavirus” the official name of the disease is now 
covid-19. The name of the virus causing the disease is severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (WHO 2020a).  
The scale and rapid spread of the pandemic until now is partly being attributed to the 
non-transparent behavior of the Chinese health authorities, the failure of Chinese state media 
to report the severity of the virus as well as lately imposed travel restrictions to and from 
affected areas. Also, a more globalized world and the fact that Wuhan is a huge communication 
hub combined with the spread emerging around the time of the Chinese New Year accelerated 
the transmission even more. The absence of a vaccination or another effective cure is limiting 
the possibilities to medically contain the disease leaving all efforts to include isolation and 
social distancing. Laboratory testing possibilities and protective gear are also scarce (Peeri et 
al. 2020, p.6). 
Preparation can be one of the major differences between a successful and unsuccessful 
mitigation of transmission of covid-19. Many countries in Asia have experienced epidemics on 
several occasions and therefore had a quick response when covid-19 started to gain foothold in 
early 2020. Vietnam that enforced measures that looked like an “overreaction” even before 
WHO declared Covid-19 a pandemic, has seemingly done very well this far with no reported 
deaths (as of May 26th, 2020) (Jones 2020; Vu & Tran 2020, Worldometer 2020b). South 
Korea has a leading position when it comes to mitigating the outbreak, mainly through 
excessive testing. Drive through testing sites has been set up in combination with urging 
citizens to report any symptoms to the health authorities through a smartphone application, 
which makes it possible to monitor new possible cases in real time (Yeung 2020). Gudi and 
Tiwari points out that the current pandemic is not only a curse, but also a tremendous 
opportunity for us to improve and refine our healthcare facilities and practices. Also, to learn 
how to cope with these kinds of situations on a global scale in the future (Gudi & Tiwari 2020, 
p.111).  
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Study objects  
The selected countries South Korea and Vietnam are both located in Asia and represent 
different income levels and political systems. Both countries have a history of epidemics related 
to zoonotic viruses. 
South Korea 
South Korea is according to ITU and the UN M49 standard regarded a developed country (ITU 
2020a). World Bank classifies South Korea as a high-income country (World Bank 2020b). 
The Human Development Index (HDI) for South Korea is 0.906 which classifies as “very high” 
(UNDP 2019). The country has 51 million inhabitants (2017), almost exclusively of Koreans 
but a small Chinese minority. It’s one of the most urbanized and most densely populated 
countries in the world (Landguiden 2020a). 
South Korea is now a republic state but has faced many years of instability since the 
end of their civil war in 1953 and ruled by military-dominated dictatorship. The country 
considered to have entered a formal democracy in 1987. However, not receiving their first 
president without a military background until 1992. Despite this, the country has continued to 
be characterized by corruption scandals within the government followed by public 
demonstrations. The domestic politics are polarized with a conservative party grouping and a 
left-wing liberal, the power has alternated between the two political groups based in each region 
of the country. The conservative parties have had their stronghold in the industrial areas of 
south-eastern South Korea, while more left-wing parties have been strongest in the southwest, 
where incomes are lower (Landguiden 2020a). 
The standard of living and social conditions has improved radically for most South 
Koreans from the 1960s onwards. However, the income gap is growing (Landguiden 2020a). 
The National Health Insurance Program comprises most of the population and a few percent 
are supported by Medical Aid, resulting in full access to health care for the whole population 
(Soong 2009, p.207-209). The society has a strong hierarchical and patriarchal structure. The 
media can operate freely and are active in the scrutiny of power holders. However, journalists 
are limited by the security legislation and can be prosecuted for defamation (Landguiden 
2020a).  
The public trust towards the government and the political parties has been jeopardized 
though several events and lack of transparency within the state apparatus over the past decades. 
Data from several international and national surveys between 1981 and 2010 demonstrate a 
decrease in the level of trust in government in Korea (Korea Development Institute 2006; 
OECD 2015. In: Kim, Lee & Lee 2018 p.74). Another study presents minimal public trust in 
the parliament, low level of trust towards their legal system, and in media. In contrast, the 
public had high trust for the army and the public health system (Tan & Tambyah 2011, p.368-
369). In order to restore trust, the Korean government has made considerable efforts to adopt 
and promote various citizen participation programs at all levels of government in an effort to 
ensure accountability, improve transparency and trust (Kim, Lee & Lee 2018, p.73). 
South Korea has been acknowledged in its great capabilities to address emerging and 
re-emerging infectious disease threats and public health emergencies by analyzing their IHR 
core capacities. However, possibilities to further improvements has been observed, e.g. 
continual strengthening of the National IHR Focal Point (IHR NFP) function and the IHR 
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coordination capacity with other sectors including animal health and environment, as well as 
improved risk communication with affected communities. Despite that, there is a clear 
expectation that South Korea will embrace a leadership role at the regional and global level 
regarding preparedness and management of epidemics and other public health emergencies 
(WHO 2017a, p.1-2). South Korea’s Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan 
(2006) has an operative focus with clear instructions on how to operate during the different 
phases and levels of an international and domestic pandemic. It addresses the WHO pandemic 
phases as well as their own four-level color-coded system for different alert levels during a 
pandemic (Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) & Korean Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (KCDC) 2006, p.8). 
Vietnam  
Vietnam is according to ITU and the UN M49 standard a developing country (ITU 2020a). 
World Bank classifies Vietnam as a lower middle-income country (World Bank 2020b). The 
Human Development Index (HDI) for Vietnam is 0.693 which is also regarded middle (UNDP 
2019). Vietnam gained its independence from France in 1954 and was after that ravaged by the 
civil war between a communist North and a South supported by the West. The war lasted until 
1975 when the communist party of Hanoi enjoyed the victory, but at a high cost with millions 
of lives lost and many more traumatized. Today, Vietnam's official name is the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, it is considered a communist one-party state. The country has over 95 
million inhabitants with the majority population consisting of the “Viet” or “Kinh”, almost 
90% identifies with this group.  
The majority group is in dominance when it comes to economy, politics and culture. 
Unfortunately, 86% of Vietnam’s poor belong to ethnic minorities (World Bank 2020a). 
Officially, there are 54 ethnic groups in Vietnam recognized by the government. Only one of 
these, the Chinese (Hoa) are statistically not at greater risk of poverty and living in an 
inaccessible location (often the mountainous areas). Lower literacy has been detected among 
students in these areas and local health workers tend to be focused on urban rather than rural 
regions. The same government that recognized these ethnic minorities also refers to them as 
underdeveloped and unprogressive while praising the Kinh majority for its advancement. This 
cultural oppression leads to ethnic minorities adapting and changing their traditional lifestyle 
as it is associated with poverty and disease (McKinn et al. 2017, p.2; Målqvist et al. 2013, p.2; 
Fritzen 2007, p.76). 
Compared to other countries at the same income level the Vietnamese has relatively 
good health, housing and a well-developed school system. This mainly due to the lifting of 
trade restrictions and opening up the economy in the 1980’s. The communist party is regardless 
the driving force in the whole society and its regime can be said to be one of the most 
authoritarian in Asia (Landguiden 2020b). Liberal economic policies were introduced after the 
planned economy failed to deliver, culminating in a social crisis. Trust among the citizens 
declined sharply and the Communist party acted to save its legitimacy and safeguard its 
domination. Doi Moi (Đổi Mới in Vietnamese), the financial reform of 1986 restored trust in 
the government and enforced its power monopoly (Nguyen 2016, p.33-34). 
In the context of health, the communication structures have been a barrier as they have 
always been unidirectional. Consequently, a gap between health knowledge and actual health 
practices has emerged. Many claim that the government of Vietnam has not been sensitive 
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enough when it comes to differences within the country, and traditional practices among 
various ethnic groups has been attributed debt for not breaking patterns of harmful health 
behaviors. Failure to adapt communication to various contexts and cultural approaches as well 
as exclusion of specific groups has been pointed out as a reason (McKinn et al. 2017, p.8; 
Målqvist et al. 2013, p.1). Research show that ethnic minorities use the public health services 
less than the majority population, long distances and financial issues play a role, but also 
discrimination, both of structural origin and directly from health staff (Målqvist et al. 2013 p.1 
& 6). For example, a passive style of information dissemination is common, distributing 
handbooks and generic information that the receiver is not always susceptible to for various 
reasons (McKinn et al. 2017, p.8). 
Vietnam strives to implement a “One Health Approach” where the focus is shifted from 
not mainly human health, but equally incorporate the health and welfare of animals and nature 
as well. Land use changes and their effects on wildlife are recognized as a driver to possible 
new infection pathways from animals to humans and the strategy aims to reach the source of 
zoonotic transmission rather than treating human to human spread when it occurs and threatens 
to escalate to an epidemic or pandemic. The One Health approach also highlights the effects 
on economic, social, human and environmental processes and hence the total cost of neglecting 
the health and welfare of nature and animals, this also relates to other hazards such as air 
pollution and a decrease of ecosystem services (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD) & Ministry of Health (MOH) 2011, p.viii & 11). 
A census measuring trust in Vietnam show that the Vietnamese population had the 
highest level of trust in their public education system. The public health system also enjoyed 
relatively high levels of trust. Vietnam did not participate in regards of trust towards the 
political institutions, consisting of central government, local government, the army, parliament, 
congress and the political party. The media received the highest level of trust in Vietnam (Tan 
& Tambyah 2011, p.368-369). 
Regarding pandemic phases in Vietnam, there are no clear structure found from official 
sources. The pandemic phases of Vietnam are briefly described as phase one being a smaller 
external threat with risk of import of the virus from one or a few countries, the second phase 
being a big risk of importing the virus because its present in many countries and the third phase 
being a high risk of domestic/community spread (Vu & Tran 2020). All preventative and 
emergency measures are general and not connected to a specific phase of the 
epidemic/pandemic. The Vietnamese government addresses this in the pandemic preparedness 
plan, as they aim to evaluate the need and possible improvement of their response in this matter 
(MARD & MOH 2011, p.48 & 83).  
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Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework contributes to support an understanding of the risk communication 
strategies from a scientific point of view and to evaluate the strategies and their possible success 
and inclusion of vulnerable groups in the context of an epidemic or pandemic. Theories are 
including government trust and compliance, risk- and crisis communication and inequality.  
Government trust theory 
In a communicable disease risk or crisis situation, the trustee’s perceptions of the 
satisfactoriness of the trustor to address the risk or crisis will draw on the trustor’s 
preexisting reputation, his or her past and present relationship experiences, and the 
credibility of the trustee’s advice; this will, in turn, determine the willingness of the trustee 
to engage in preventive or emergency behaviors proposed by the trustor. 
(Cairns, de Andrade & MacDonald 2013, p.1552) 
 
Levi & Stoker points to the “minimal consensus” among scholars when it comes to defining 
trust. Trust is something relational that needs to be established between two or more entities, 
involved someone (an individual or group) making itself vulnerable by to another individual, 
group or institution that can do her harm with ill will (Levi & Stoker 2000, p.476). Many 
scholars agree that trust in the government is an important part of cooperation and action among 
the citizens. Trust can normally be related to policy expectations and people being satisfied by 
policies implemented by the government (Im et al. 2012, p.746-747). Chuang et al. refers to 
Szreter and Woolcock (2004) that have defined trust as two separate dimensions: the first one 
based on the relationship between the trusting individual and the other (relational trust), the 
second dimension is referring to previous behavior (calculative trust) (Chuang et al. 2015, p.7).  
What causes the public not to trust its government? 
To already have cultivated trust in some sense and be prepared is the key to gaining trust when 
an epidemic is present among a population (Cairns, de Andrade & MacDonald 2013, p.1554; 
Chuang et al. 2015, p.7). Planning in advance is also one of five principles set out by the World 
Health Organization Outbreak Communication Guidelines’ following the 2005 SARS outbreak 
(WHO 2005b). Trust is rather linked to the political life of the people, not their personalities or 
social characteristics. People who distrust the government are not satisfied with policy choices. 
Also, political scandals, war, critical media messages conveyed to the public, politicians 
portrayed as selfish can contribute negatively (Levi & Stoker 2000, p.480-481). The 
governments responsiveness towards the public is also indispensable, if problems previously 
pointed out by the public remains unsolved the trust in the government decreases (Levi & 
Stoker 2000, p.482-483). 
Government performance is also central, when it comes to maintaining economic 
growth and creating stability and prosperity. If the government fail to do this, distrust escalates 
(Kampen, Van De Walle & Bouckaert 2006, p.387) “political trust has been shown to fluctuate 
in accordance with government performance”. Mostly economic performance is being 
examined in the literature but social performance (policies related to education, health care, 
etc.) is also an extremely important factor (Ellinas & Lamprianou 2014, p.232). Schools and 
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hospitals are a concrete and clear sign of mismanagement if they don’t work as expected and 
the trust will be affected accordingly (ibid, p.248).  
Scholars underline the essentiality of transparency, to hide negative development with 
the motivation to avoid panic is never a good idea (Cairns, de Andrade & MacDonald 2013, 
p.1558). When an “external threat” is present, such as an influenza epidemic, trust can increase 
in the short run because the people turn to the government. Correspondingly, with an internal 
failure present, trust declines (Citrin & Stoker 2018, p.59). Ellinas & Lamprianou points out 
that “The main expectation is that during extraordinary economic shocks, the economic and 
social performance of government has a stronger effect on political trust than during normal 
times.” (Ellinas & Lamprianou 2014, p.232). 
Compliance connected to trust 
Compliance can in many ways be interlinked with trust, as the public tends to respond 
positively to measures in accordance with the authorities recommendations or regulations if 
they trust their government. This enables the government to limit or make changes in people's 
everyday life without coercion (Kampen, Van De Walle & Bouckaert 2006, p.387; Levi & 
Stoker 2000, p.492). 
The relevance of trust in challenging events such as disasters and epidemics lies in the 
possibility for the government to implement regulations and guide the people through the crisis. 
For this to be a realistic possibility, it’s essential that the public follow recommendations and 
regulations. If citizens trust their government it is more likely that they obey and follow their 
directives without coercion (Levi & Stoker 2000, p.492; Kampen, Van De Walle & Bouckaert 
2006, p.387) In addition to coercive measures and prohibitions, to avoid panic and 
misinformation, transparency between government bodies and the public is essential in 
educating citizens on the risks of transmission (Gudi & Tiwari 2020, p.108). Hence, 
trustworthiness and credibility of government messages is a powerful moderator for public 
health system effectiveness (Cairns, de Andrade & MacDonald 2013, p.1550 & 1557). 
During the Ebola epidemic in Liberia, the people not trusting the government showed 
tendencies to not obey to restrictions of social distancing or make changes in their daily lives. 
Adopting practices recommended by the government such as “safe burials” of infected bodies 
was not followed in many cases even though people showed no signs of understanding less 
about symptoms or transmission of Ebola. They simply did not trust the recommendations 
made by the government to mitigate the transmission. The people who suffered most from the 
epidemic trusted the government even less (this causes a downward spiral of distrust, suffering, 
less trust and less compliance which increases the spread of disease even more (Blair, Morse 
& Tsaib 2017, p.89). 
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Crisis & risk communication theory 
Risk communication is defined as an exchange of information regarding risks, resulted by 
environmental and industrial processes, policies or products form individuals, groups and 
institutions. 
(Glik 2007, p.33) 
 
Risk communication is local, regional or national authorities providing information to the 
public, preceding a crisis but also during and after the crisis is over. The information must be 
“understandable, timely, transparent and coordinated” (COMBI 2012, p.xii). To foster a 
dialogue with the public, where they experience a “two-way communication” with the 
authorities, is also central (Cairns, de Andrade & MacDonald 2013, p.1555). Not only for 
recognition that their experience matter, but also to be aware of rumors circulating in 
communities and to estimate the impact of the current situation from the perspective of locals 
(COMBI 2012, p.12). 
Olofsson and Öhman (2009) explain that risk communication can be seen as a generic 
term for all type of information and communication regarding potential risks that occurs before, 
during and after a crisis or disaster (Olofsson & Öhman 2009, p.70). Risk communication is 
associated with general social and cultural conditions and can be seen as an objective and 
subjective process as exchange of information occur repeatedly between individuals, groups 
and authorities. Therefore, risk communication and the conveyed message is a result of 
different social, cultural and psychological influences (ibid, p.72). 
The foundation of risk communication  
In their book about risk communication Olofsson and Öhman (2009) address five important 
factors in a communication process which also applies to risk communication;    
● The transmitter/the source - the agency that begins to communicate.  
● The message - the information which is conveyed in different forms e.g. verbally, 
written, in sign language, in pictures or like music. 
● The receiver/audience - Could be the public, a specific target group or individual.  
● The channel - The communication channel used to mediate the information. The 
common channels for risk communication are mass media like television, radio and 
Internet, as well as books and newspapers.   
● The effect - The result of the message, represented through the transfer of information, 
attitude or behavior change, organizational change, reduced anxiety and insecurity both 
in the long and short term (Olofsson & Öhman 2009, p.71).   
 
Mass media has an important role in communicating and mediate information during a crisis, 
other actors such as organizations also have a role in risk communication. This can be public, 
private and voluntary organizations such as municipalities, authorities and aid organizations 
(ibid p.87). Scientists studying organizational risk communication divides the research into two 
alignment called form and content. The form focuses on how the organization act and the 
content deal with what the organization communicates i.e. the message. Furthermore, 
researchers agree on how organizations should act in a crisis, i.e. the form. Effective risk 
communication is built up by three factors; quickly convey information about the crisis, correct 
information as well as an open and objective organization. These modes of action are important 
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in order to create and convey trust to the audience, which is essential for effective 
communication. However, researchers disagree regarding the content and the design of the 
information and message. The strategies vary depending on who the sender is. But there is a 
trend to adopt the blame, this in order to - once again - preserve credibility and the image of 
the organization (ibid, p.88-89).   
Vulnerable groups & communication inequalities 
Risk communication must address the specific needs of multiple populations, 
including the more vulnerable. 
(Hutchins et al. 2009 in: Cairns, de Andrade & MacDonald 2013, p.1554) 
 
People should be given the possibility to make informed choices, but awareness is needed 
regarding their different prerequisites and that everyone will not have the possibility to act 
100% properly on information because of diverse needs and interests (Cairns, de Andrade & 
MacDonald 2013, p.1556). People with higher socioeconomic position including variables 
such as race, gender, age, education, employment, income, social networks, etc. are often 
exposed to more relevant and a larger amount of information, which supports them in shielding 
themselves from the direct or indirect consequences of a disaster (Viswanath 2006, p.222; 
Taylor-Clark, Viswanath & Blendon 2010, p.222 & 224). In the direct presence of a disaster, 
three components are vital: “access”, “understanding/processing” and “utilization”, that is to 
be informed, to understand the scope of the information and in the last stage to have the 
possibility to act on it. Research shows that higher SES groups significantly have a higher 
responsiveness in all three stages, with being exposed to evacuation messages being the most 
important one (Taylor-Clark, Viswanath & Blendon 2010, p.226-227). 
Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger address the importance to consider the diversity and 
communication needs of diverse groups and stakeholders in risk communication. Particular 
audience may have specific communication needs or desires. Furthermore, presenting three 
options in developing crisis messages for underrepresented populations. i) Cultural-neutral 
approach - imply that all stakeholders and groups act on and access crisis communication 
information in similar. An example of this approach was the crisis communication during 
Hurricane Katrina. The construction and the presentation of the crisis communication during 
this catastrophe did not consider or did not have concern for the socioeconomic background or 
crisis communication needs of African American and other underrepresented groups in New 
Orleans. ii) Culturally-sensitive approach - imply that crisis communication messages should 
be adapted by cataloguing cultural characteristics of underrepresented groups to meet their 
crisis communication needs. Some groups may prefer information provided by members of 
their own cultural group, others at certain locations, such as churches or community gathering 
places. Others may want crisis messages to contain certain terms or be written at a particular 
literacy level. iii) Culture-centered approach - develops the culturally-sensitive approach 
further by including underrepresented populations in preparing for and communicating about 
crisis. Underrepresented stakeholders would thereby be involved in determining who would 
present their crisis messages and in what manner. The approach suggests that partnerships with 
underrepresented populations should be developed prior to a crisis to ensure effective 
communication with these groups following an event (Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger 2011, p.47-
48). 
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Scholars findings also suggest that social ties play a crucial role in individual’s response 
and shielding from external threats. According to the research by Chuang et al., social capital 
is a determinant for “health protective behavior” such as vaccinations, wearing a face mask or 
washing hand more frequently during a disease outbreak. According to the model by Szreter 
and Woolcock (2004), social capital consists of; bonding (to have close relationships with 
neighbors), bridging (member of an association of some kind) and linking (and connectedness 
to the government and other institutional powers) (in: Chuang et al. 2015, p.2). Chuang et al. 
comes to the conclusion that bonding social capital (close relationship with neighbors) was 
elevating all health protecting behaviors through spread of information by trusted individuals. 
Awareness was created through social networks. Also, peer pressure and feelings of moral 
responsibility might have played a role here. Increasing community level social capital can 
prevent spread of infectious disease (ibid, p.7) The authors conclude that: bonding and linking 
social capital should be promoted by the government to increase the protection among a 
population (ibid, p.11). 
Structural Influence Model (SIM) of Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness Communication 
This model is developed by Viswanath K, Ramanadhan S-R, Kontos E-Z. (2007) and has 
frequently appeared in studies regarding health communication and information. The model 
links social determinants (e.g., race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status) with Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) outcomes mediated through communication, see Figure 2 
(Lin et al. 2014a, p.2). According to SIM, public communications can influence health by 
raising awareness, providing information, and reinforcing knowledge and behaviors. However, 
communication inequalities can affect people’s attention to, processing of, and acting upon 
health information and the consequential behavioral outcomes, thereby increase the gap among 
social groups (Lin et al. 2014b, p.50). In this thesis SIM will be used to investigate and explain 
the results of countries strategies and plans related to risk communication. Further, to clarify 
the factors behind succeeded and unsuccessful communication strategies related to an 
epidemic.   
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Figure 2. Structural Influence Model (SIM) of Public Health Emergency Preparedness Communications
Adapted from: Lin et al. (2014a, p.5)  
The Digital Divide 
Already in 1996, when the internet had just seen the light of day, Allan Hammond pointed out 
that the risk was that many of the less fortunate in society would get left behind in the rapid 
development of new technologies, these would in the future be essential to take part in society 
and be reached by public services. For example, poorer or remote cities that would not be able 
to partake in finance and commerce (Hammond 1996, p.186). Poorer citizens that would not 
be able to call for help in an emergency (ibid, p.188), or talented students with no literacy for 
communication devices that would be excluded from education and highly qualified jobs (ibid, 
p.189). Hammond also pointed out digital tools as the fastest way to inform oneself about 
politics and as well as the fastest way to spread one's own political message. Lower levels of 
education and skills is a risk factor for exclusion and infringements to citizens freedom of 
speech (ibid, p.192). Those who best controlled the technology came out as winners in the US-
election in 1994, while minorities were portrayed in an unfair and stereotypical way, which 
they had little control over due to their almost insignificant representation in media ownership, 
the same was valid for women (ibid, p.191). Big disparities were also evident between groups 
of different socioeconomic status (ibid, p.196). 
Today, significant progress in the fields of biomedical engineering together with new 
communication technologies gives us the tools to interfere the cycle of many diseases and stop 
them. But the rich are still getting richer and the poor getting poorer when it comes to health 
and information (Viswanath 2006, p.249). The recognition of Allan Hammond in 1996 now 
seems distant in time, but many of these challenges still remain. 
The connectivity of the new media was believed to be the start of an electronic 
democracy (Hammond 1996, p.181). As it was increasing the opportunity for the (American) 
people to be connected to their friends, increase available services and make it possible for 
them to do their work from a distance and call for help in case of an emergency. But the 
expansion of such networks having mainly a commercial aim, lead to leaving those who are 
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older or with a lower purchasing power behind as these are viewed as “undesirable markets” 
(ibid, p.182). The new interconnectedness between different mediums should according to 
Hammond, not be seen as an information highway, but rather as a national nervous system. 
Where the parts that are not actively used wither away and die - in this case of non-access to 
information and communication (ibid, p.184). 
People who are lacking access to the internet today, can according to the NGO Nethope 
be divided into four groups; 1) those who either can’t afford a subscription even though a 
connection is available 2) those who don’t see a value in their context compared to the cost 3) 
people who live in an area where there is no infrastructure that can provide them with a 
connection, and 4) The last and most vulnerable group is living in a remote are with no 
infrastructure and would not have the economical means to invest in internet access even if it 
was available (Nethope 2015, p.30). SPIDER concludes, that in their mapping of HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, many of the rural inhabitants lack the access to information systems that would help 
them to shield themselves from disease. The problems mainly consist of lack of infrastructure 
and language barriers (SPIDER 2007, p.34). 
There are several dimensions of communication inequality, where the first is access to 
and use of information channels, the different groups of this dimension are described above 
with reference to Nethope. The second being attention to and processing of health information. 
Thirdly there can be disparities in the ability to act on provided information (Viswanath 2006, 
p.222). 
Some disastrous events and their outcomes can be connected to this problematic 
exclusion. When hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in 2005, the following discussion in 
the media was concerning why many of the residents stayed in their homes even though the 
class 5 hurricane was closing in. Many of them was disregarded as “irrational” (Taylor-Clark, 
Viswanath & Blendon 2010, p.221). This unfair portrayal of the victims fails to recognize that 
for example transportation (physical barriers) also play a big role (ibid, p.227). As referred to 
earlier in this chapter, Lin et al. research communication inequalities and how they were present 
during the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic. They ask how the public could receive, understand and 
act upon government information, depending on race, education, income, etc. (Lin et al. 2014a, 
p.1). They conclude that older people, groups of higher income and education levels as well as 
homeownership was linked with higher knowledge about A(H1N1)pdm09. Also, the tendency 
to adopt health protective behavior was higher among groups with a higher socioeconomic 
status (ibid, p.7). They also highlight that people with different education levels have a 
disposition toward different information sources. As shown in their data, groups with lower 
education gravitate more towards the television for information while those with higher 
education more often turned to the internet (ibid, p.8). 
The audience (receptors of communication) needs to be carefully identified, defined 
and characterized (Viswanath 2006, p.237) Psychological characteristics needs to play a big 
role (Cairns, de Andrade & MacDonald 2013, p.1555; Viswanath 2006, p.238). Cooperation 
with different strategic partners for support in disseminating information, for credibility and 
broadening reach (Viswanath 2006, p.241-42). Channels for dissemination needs to be chosen 
carefully, as different channels complement each other. Reach, control over the message, 
intensity and cost will determine the choice (ibid, p.242-243). Example of channels are 
interpersonal (word of mouth), organizational, mass media and social media. Choice should be 
based on: Demography, race/ethnicity, lifestyle and orientation (ibid, p.249).  
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The government needs to understand how social relationships and networks operate to 
adequately respond to the needs of the people. Engagement from the authorities side, with 
different social networks can help to reach a larger part of the population and to make them 
understand the risk in an appropriate way (Taylor-Clark, Viswanath & Blendon 2010, p.222) 
The government also needs to be adaptable to change their routines and their communication 
practices along the way, setting up a surveillance system with particular focus on disadvantaged 
groups. Important information such as health information needs, information seeking practices, 
media use and current knowledge base (Viswanath 2006, p.249). 
Two major challenges are underlined: 1) Present information in an understandable way 
(language, etc.) in appropriate channels, it will be difficult because of the many stakeholders 
disseminating information. 2) Make sure that information is available to those who need it the 
most, those with a lower SES (Viswanath 2006, p.217 & 224). 
Summary of the theoretical framework 
Government trust can be seen as the foundation structure of strengthening a government's 
ability to implement regulations without coercion. Central to enhancement of trust is 
government performance, mainly regarding economic policy but also social policies such as 
the function of welfare systems. The trust needs to be constantly cultivated through 
transparency, adherence and responsiveness towards the public's opinions and criticism. The 
circumstances during an epidemic requires this to be executed quickly and precise. With the 
public trusting that following guidelines will protect them, in combination with correctly 
comprehension of risks, the response efficiency is significantly bolstered as a flexible approach 
builds resilience. 
Crisis & risk communication theory explains how information during a risk should be 
effectively communicated with the public in order to achieve requested compliance and 
mitigate panic among the audience. The communication should be timely, consistent, 
transparent and flexible to the development of the crisis. There must be a variety of 
communication channels in mediating the information as well as specifically designed 
information in order to reach different population groups who hold different communication 
and compliance needs. People's risk perception will determine their compliance towards the 
risk communication. Therefore, responsiveness and evaluation of the public risk perception is 
a priority in order to convey accurate risk information and receive a desirable response.    
Vulnerable groups can be subjected to exclusion on various levels and of various kinds, 
one of them being not having access to networks through which information can be both 
received and dispatched, this inability to partake through mediated information is also referred 
to as the Digital Divide. This has its foundation in a weak financial position but also other 
factors such as language barriers, ethnicity, education level, remote living conditions, 
occupational hazards and limited possibility to shield oneself from risks. Communication 
inequalities emerged mainly through the notion that the public consist of a homogenous mass 
with equal possibilities to access information and also, to act upon that information. The 
structural influence model (SIM) shows the linkages between social determinants and PHEP, 
mediated by communication. Access to various mediums as well as amount of exposure, 
receptivity, trust and information processing and utilization are all influencing how well 
individuals can successfully shield themselves from disaster threats. To overcome these 
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barriers, psychological, socioeconomic and culturally sensitive approaches with a special 
attention to the communication method of choice needs to be executed. 
Method 
This chapter serves to motivate and explain the methodological approach, collection and 
analysis of data as well as critically reflecting on these choices. A literature- and case analysis 
has been conducted. Secondary data through scientific books and articles, grey literature and 
statistical data has been combined to provide a comprehensive understanding. The topic has 
been examined through a social scientific point of view and not a medical one.  
The search engines SöderScholar, GoogleScholar, Scopus and KCI-Korean Journal 
Database has been used to find theories and empirical material. The material was limited to the 
English language. Key search terms: Vietnam, South Korea, risk communication, information 
inequality, influenza, pandemic, epidemic, Avian influenza, H1N1, MERS, Covid-19, risk 
communication strategies, government trust, ICT access, ICT4D, digital divide, health 
inequality, socioeconomic status, vulnerable groups, public health emergency preparedness. 
Statistics has been collected from: International Telecommunications Union and Worldometer. 
The study objects, South Korea and Vietnam, have been selected in accordance with 
two criteria. i) Historically affected by outbreaks of novel influenza viruses. ii) Have developed 
a national plan for influenza preparedness and risk management published on the WHO 
website: WHO Influenza - National Plans for Pandemic Preparedness and Risk Management 
(WHO 2020b).  
The empirical data consisting of risk communication strategies and outcomes of the two 
study objects South Korea and Vietnam was organized in seven subgroups in order to achieve 
a systematic structure. The subgroups have partly been adapted from the WHO guideline 
Communicating Risk in Public Health Emergencies: A WHO guideline for emergency risk 
communication (ERC) policy and practice (WHO 2018c). Alterations and additions have been 
made in accordance with the nature of the study findings. The empirical results for strategies 
and outcomes are divided in seven subgroups for both study objects.  
 
Governance & leadership (trust) 
How is the governmental organization and management conducted in order to foster legitimacy 
and trust? 
 
Communication channels 
Which media and communication channels are being used to convey risk communication 
messages? 
 
Messages 
What is communicated? 
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Communicating uncertainty (transparency) 
Is transparency apparent in the risk communication strategy? How are risk communications 
messages communicated? 
 
Community engagement (compliance) 
How is the public responding to the risk communication messages? 
 
Inequality & access 
Are there possible failures in the information flow, that prevents vulnerable groups from 
receiving or acting on risk communication messages? 
 
Adaption to a diverse public 
Is the public as a heterogenous group acknowledged? 
 
After sorting the empirical data under these subgroups, theories were applied to explain the 
empirical results and their meaning for risk communication efforts in South Korea and 
Vietnam. 
Limitations  
Risk communication includes all type of communication during an event of an emergency, for 
example inter-agency communication and communication between health professionals. This 
study will be limited to the risk communication from authorities directed towards the 
population of a country to mitigate the spread of influenza disease.  
Only secondary sources of empirical data have been used and hence no data collection 
has taken place to facilitate the empirical support of this study in particular. We are aware of 
the many uncertainties related to statistical data that will affect the results. E.g. irregular 
collection of statistics, different methods of collection, underreported statistics, statistical gaps, 
etc. Preferably, firsthand data on the risk communication to the national epidemics from the 
governments of South Korea and Vietnam should be analyzed. Suggestively through surveys 
within affected populations in different regions. Age, income, education level, ICT access and 
risk communication messages received from the government should be included. As the covid-
19 is a current pandemic the facts and information used in this thesis will be based mainly on 
news sources and national authorities publications as scientific sources is still scarce.  
There are indications that a revised and updated version of the South Korean influenza 
preparedness plans from 2006 exists, but no published version has been found. Other 
documents that might be of interest, such as the National Plan for Infectious Disease Control 
and Prevention 2013 (WHO 2017a, p.7), Risk Communication Standard Operating Procedure 
for Public Health Emergencies 2017 and Risk Communication Guideline for Public Health 
Emergencies 2017 are neither public available (WHO 2017a, p.44-47; KCDC, n.d).  
The Vietnamese influenza preparedness plan revised is succeeded by several 
documents, these could possibly give a more detailed view on risk communication efforts. 
These include; the Mitigation of Zoonotic Diseases for the Period 2016-2020, the National 
Strategic Framework for Avian and Human Influenza Communications, A risk communication 
plan (developed in 2013) for the period 2017–2021, as well as a Standard Operating Procedure 
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for risk communications developed in 2015. However, neither of these documents are publicly 
available (WHO 2017b). Further, a master plan on health risk communication for 2020-2025 
is currently being developed (Park 2019). It is assessed that the empirical data from the 
documents included in this study is enough to analyze the risk communication strategies for 
both study objects. 
There are countless factors that contribute to a rapid and uncontrollable spread of 
epidemics and pandemics, sometimes crisis preparedness and communication efforts are 
fruitless regardless of the resources invested. This thesis lacks the full scope to take all these 
factors into account and will solely focus on risk communication strategies and mapping its 
possible outcomes. 
Empirical data 
The empirical data is structured as followed. Firstly, selected epidemics and ICT access in each 
study object will be presented shortly. Secondly, the empirical data of both the national 
influenza preparedness plans and scientific articles on risk communication outcomes in relation 
to the epidemics will be summarized. This data is presented through grouping the findings 
relating to the same topics of risk communication in each subgroup, see Appendixes 1-6.  
South Korea 
Selected influenza outbreaks in South Korea 
“The Swine flu” A/H1N1 pandemic 2009  
The first report of a A(H1N1)pdm09 case in South Korea came on April 28th 2009 (Lee et al. 
2013). Between May 2009 and August 2010, 750,000 cases of pandemic influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09 were confirmed by laboratory test. The A(H1N1)pdm09-related death toll was 
estimated to reach 252 individuals, resulting in a case-fatality ratio on 0.03% in South Korea. 
However, the mortality rate of A(H1N1)pdm09-associated pneumonia was 7.2% (Kim 2016, 
p.71).  
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) 2015 
The MERS epidemic in South Korea has had a huge impact on their society. There had never 
been cases of MERS in South Korea before so the rapid transmission in the country was a result 
inadequate awareness, preparation and quarantine requirements as well as slow diagnostics and 
delayed information to the public. The outbreak began on May 20th, 2015. The first diagnosed 
patient got infected on a business trip in the Middle East. This patient is referred to as the 
“super-spreader” as he infected 91 people due to his many hospital visits before he got 
diagnosed. A total of 186 cases were confirmed with 38 deaths resulting in a case fatality ratio 
on 20,4%. Nearly 17 thousand people were quarantined (Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) & 
KCDC 2017, p. 8-10). South Korea had the highest numbers of cases outside the Middle East 
(Vox 2020).  
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Covid-19 (SARS-CoV-2) 2020 
The first cases in South Korea were reported in late January, and then surged a few weeks later 
resulting in over 5000 infected in February, one of the highest numbers of infected cases in the 
world (Vox 2020). Authorities launched a massive contact-tracing and testing regime to 
identify and then isolate infected people, even setting up drive-through testing centers. On 
March 18th the country has tested more people per capita than any country in the world — a 
total of nearly 300,000 people (Zastrow 2020). Due to lessons learned from the previous 
outbreak of MERS in 2015, South Korea was well prepared to face the pandemic. They 
implemented fast actions in an early stage and manage to flatten their curve relatively fast. 
Besides the contact-tracing which means contacting every person an infected person has been 
close to (human to human transmission), South Korea also uses another strategy to trace and 
map infected peoples living patterns. During a disease outbreak, the government can collect 
patient’s data and security footage, to log and share them online so other people know what 
places to avoid in order to prevent infection (Vox 2020). When a person tests positive, their 
city or district might send out an alert to people living nearby about their movements before 
being diagnosed. A typical alert can contain the infected person’s age and gender, and a detailed 
log of their movements. This type of surveillance system has got a lot of attention and been 
questioning whether it is a violation of privacy. A consequence could be that people with 
symptoms avoid testing due to the fear of getting identified and thereby face stigmatization 
(Ward 2020). However, a majority support the government's strategies, most people “preferred 
the public good to individual rights”. Through the extensive tracing, testing and isolation 
measures — along with campaigns encouraging people to avoid large gatherings, the 
government has refrained from imposing a lockdown (Zastrow 2020; Vox 2020). As of May 
20th, the country had reported 11 110 confirmed cases, 263 deaths and 10 066 recovered cases 
(Worldometer 2020a).  
ICT access in South Korea  
South Korea has for long been a technological flagship where information and communication 
technology has had a rapid development, see Table 1. ICT has been a priority and South Korea 
was the second country in the world to use the internet in 1982 (Kim & Jeong 2010, p.36). 
Along with the widespread adoption of broadband, the digital divide has been well recognized 
by the government. In 1984 the government established the Information Technology Training 
Centre (ITTC) to educate the public in order to reduce the gap. Free computer classes were 
offered to rural and agricultural areas in 1988, followed by several initiatives to provide ICT 
access and skills to different target groups. In the white paper “Bridging the Digital Divide” 
2003, lack of internet access was identified as a socioeconomic issue along with other social-
exclusion parameters, such as income, education and region. In order to improve the social 
disadvantages, the government provide ubiquitous access to the internet but failed to equip 
users with appropriate skills and knowledge (Park & Jae Kim 2014, p.72-73).  
In June 2007, 80% of the South Korean households owned a computer and 75,5% of 
the population above 6 years of age used the internet with the main purpose to collect data and 
research (Kim & Jeong 2010, p.36-38). However, the digital divide was still visible when only 
30,8% of the households with a monthly income below 1 million won (~US$ 100) owned a 
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computer and the internet usage differed depending on age, gender and education level (ibid, 
p.44-46).  
The broadband access is steadily increasing with 82.3% of South Korean household 
having access in 2012 and 78% of the population above 3 years of age use the internet, with 
85.2% of those using it daily. The same year, 64% of the population used smartphones, where 
90.9% used mobile internet (Park & Jae Kim 2014, p.72). The digital divide has been 
minimized concurrently with the rapid adoption of broadband and the number of people online 
has increased. Even if the digital divide in its traditional meaning has decreased, the second-
level digital divide, meaning the gap in skills and knowledge caused by how people use the 
internet, persists. The digital divide is still present where people with disabilities, people with 
low income and elderly are highly represented. However, the gap is currently largest for the 
agriculture/fishery group, which has always been the most disadvantaged group (ibid, p.77-
80).  
 
Table 1. The development over time for ICT access in South Korea  
Fixed broadband subscriptions 
2002 10 200 000 
2010 17 200 000 
2018  (41,6 per 100 inhabitants) 21 200 000 
Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions 
2002 32 300 000 
2010 50 800 000 
2018  (129,7 per 100 inhabitants) 66 400 000 
Individuals using the internet 
2002 60% 
2010 84% 
2018 96% 
Fixed telephone subscriptions 
2002 25 700 000 
2010 28 500 000 
2018  (50,6 per 100 inhabitants) 25 900 000 
Source: ITU (2020b) 
Key findings South Korea - Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and 
Response Plan 2006 
For complete empirical data, see Appendix 1. 
 
In the preparedness plan, its visible that building trust is a key objective for the South Korean 
government. They intend to “act with consistency” (for example by choosing one 
spokesperson) and continuously provide up-to-date information through pre-scheduled 
briefings to reach this goal. However, they aim to do so among the “general public”. This 
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indicates a lack of understanding of the public as a heterogeneous group. There is a clear 
interest to develop risk communication strategies by including a communication specialist in 
expert groups. The intention is to further develop IT infrastructure, which indicates a bias 
toward technical solutions for risk communication. The preparedness plan addresses the usage 
of several communication channels such as, 24 hours operated hotlines (which will ensure two-
way communication), phone, cell phone, printed/broadcast, posters and the internet.  
Local populations will be reached through local health care facilities. The obligation 
for the government to inform and give recommendations for health protective behavior even 
though all information is not yet available is highlighted. Compliance or the case of non-
compliance is not addressed. Information accessibility and understandability needs to be 
ensured, local residents of affected areas should be especially targeted and educated. A Rapid 
Response Team (RRT) should be dispatched locally to act as a link to the central government. 
Mapping of various stakeholders and their differences is essential, these should be included in 
any decision-making processes. 
Key findings South Korea - A(H1N1)pdm09 and MERS  
For complete empirical data, see Appendix 2. 
 
A study including 3462 participants from two rural and three urban randomly selected 
communities, shows that 88,5% obtained A(H1N1)pdm09 information through media (TV, 
radio, newspaper) but the most trusted information came from health care providers. Only 
19,9% trusted information coming from the government. Areas of raising awareness, providing 
sufficient information in a timely manner, and reinforcing public knowledge regarding 
appropriate protective and preventive behaviors needs to be further developed. It was shown 
that health protective behavior was practices more among those who did not support the ruling 
government. Those reading print newspapers, independently seeking health information 
(higher education was related to this practice), internet-users and radio-listeners were more 
likely to get vaccinated than those who didn’t. This shows a difference depending on 
information channel of choice. Lower education showed a greater exposure to entertainment 
media. Also, people with disabilities had a lower ICT user capacity than those without a 
disability. Generally, the vaccination compliance was low among groups with low SES. 
Recommendations for health protective behavior were not communicated on time during the 
MERS outbreak, resulting in inaccurate rumors and hysteria gaining foothold. Details about 
which communities were affected was not released, resulting in a lack of trust towards the 
government. Individuals showed greater compliance if they perceived the epidemic as a severe 
threat to their health and if they believed that health protective behavior were efficient. Higher 
education level and information seeking was correlated with more frequent hand washing. 
Avoidance behavior was correlated with information processing (which is related to higher 
income), that is to understand health information and act accordingly. The highest incidence 
rate during A(H1N1)pdm09 outbreak was in Gangwon which is mainly a rural area. Messages 
needs to be adapted to vulnerable population in greater occurrence, including easier access and 
appropriate language and form. 
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Key findings South Korea - Covid-19 
For complete empirical data, see Appendix 3. 
 
Many lessons have been learned from the MERS outbreak in 2015 when the government's 
approach was heavily criticized. KCDC has implemented several changes concerning risk 
communication, among other things. Communication channels used during the current covid-
19 pandemic include; emergency text messages (including targeted text messages), smartphone 
apps, websites (continuously updated) and twice daily press conferences. Sign language 
interpreters has been present. The government has also supported public private partnerships, 
for example a company that has developed a “Global Epidemic Prevention Platform” (GEPP) 
which is used and also exported, the platform is designed to alert users through an smartphone 
app if an outbreak is detected in their area. Messages transmitted to the public are warnings 
regarding infected people being present at a specific location, this made possible to intense 
surveillance system including contact tracing and collection of personal data such as credit card 
transactions, GPS location, among others. Extensive campaigns have underlined the 
importance of avoiding large gatherings, exemplified symptoms to be aware of, location of 
testing stations and in which pharmacies personal protective equipment is available. 
Transparency is one of the major priorities for the South Korean government, releasing timely 
and accurate information regarding for example hospitalizations and general development of 
the outbreak. A new law has been passed since the MERS outbreak giving the authorities 
permission to release patient information in an emergent outbreak even though it can be 
questioned from a viewpoint of individual integrity. The transparent release of information 
combined with an innovative use of technology and data is pointed out as one of the main 
strengths of the strategy, as is also minimizes fear and misinformation. The response of the 
Korean people is characterized by a strong compliance of the government guidelines, this 
exemplifies with voluntary isolation, social distancing, wearing a face mask, etc. Compliance 
may have been positively influenced by earlier epidemic experiences. 
Vietnam 
Selected influenza outbreaks in Vietnam 
“The Avian Influenza” (A/H5N1) 2003  
H5N1 was detected in Vietnam for the first time in 2001 (Carrel et al. 2010, p.1). Around 110 
human cases have been reported in Vietnam, whereof 55-56 deaths. resulting in a fatality rate 
of 50%. 32 of 64 provinces displayed occurrence of cases (Hanvoravongchai et al. 2010, p.5). 
Example of patients were chicken traders, fish farmers (using poultry excrements to feed fish) 
and people who had handled, cooked or eaten infected poultry (Kudo et al. 2012, p.142). During 
the 2003/2004 outbreak close to the entire population of poultry in Vietnam was culled (Carrel 
et al. 2010, p.1). When analyzing virus strains from poultry in Vietnam many common features 
with virus strains from southern China was found, indicating that virus spread across the 
Vietnamese-Chinese border. Also, the areas with a denser human and poultry population were 
more severely affected, for example the areas around the large cities Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi 
(Carrel et al. 2010, p.2). 
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“The Swine flu” A/H1N1 pandemic 2009  
The first case of A(H1N1)pdm09 in Vietnam was detected of May 30 st in 2009. This was a 
student returning from North America. The virus spread rapidly in the country during July 2009 
and a total of 11 000 laboratory confirmed cases and 50 deaths were detected from June to 
December 2009 (MARD & MOH 2011, p. 2; Nguyen et al. 2015, p.216). A second wave of 
the virus submerged between November 2010 and April 2011 with the peak detected in January 
2011. Later, another outbreak was identified in January 2013. The A/H1N1 virus strain is now 
regarded a seasonal virus that has reoccurred several times in Vietnam (Nguyen et al. 2015, 
p.220). Vietnam has officially stated that lessons from the A(H1N1)pdm09 should be applied 
to enhance capacity-building and efficiency in response to future pandemics and epidemics 
(MARD & MOH 2011, p. xii). 
Covid-19 (SARS-CoV-2) 2020 
Vietnamese officials began their aggressive fight against the virus already before it was 
declared a pandemic by WHO on March 11th. As soon as they detected their first case the 
government recognized covid-19 as a major threat, and even before the first case was detected, 
all medical facilities were notified and prepared with an official message on January 16th. An 
“overreaction” according to many but when the first case was confirmed January 23rd in Ho 
Chi Minh the country's response was already set in motion. Even though sharing a long border 
with China, the strategy is working very well. Vietnam has to date (May 26th, 2020) only 
detected 327 cases whereof 278 are already recovered. This far Vietnam has not suffered a 
single deadly case of covid-19 (Le 2020; Vu & Tran 2020; Worldometer 2020b). Enforcing a 
quarantine from April 1st, banning gatherings, encouraged people to stay home, wearing face 
masks and closing borders, schools and public facilities are some of the measures implemented 
this far. The Vietnamese model is a low-cost version of the mass testing executed by its 
wealthier neighboring countries, even though targeted testing is also executed for patients with 
symptoms, those with a travel history and close contacts with infected. A main driver behind 
Vietnam's rather proactive approach is medical expenses as they realized early on that a wide 
spread of the virus would quickly overwhelm the healthcare system (Jones 2020; Vu & Tran 
2020). On April 30th over 260 000 tests had been analyzed (Le 2020). Isolating at home with 
a covid-infection is not allowed, which means all patients are detained in public facilities, 
stocks of protective equipment has been secured which has led to donations of personal 
protective equipment to both Europe and other countries in Asia (Le 2020; Landguiden 2020b). 
Questions have inevitably been raised whether the official data with its strikingly low numbers 
is trustworthy. Consensus from independent representatives from both the medical and 
diplomatic community claims that there is no reason to doubt the fantastic results Vietnam's 
battle against covid-19 has shown this far (Le 2020). The nationalistic and collectivist mindset 
of the Vietnamese people has also contributed positively as it has strengthened the sense of 
coherence and mutual responsibility to fight covid-19. The fight against the common enemy is 
a rhetoric commonly used by authorities which encourages this mentality even more (Phuong 
Nguyen 2020).  
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ICT access in Vietnam 
In Vietnam mobile technology is one of the dominant communication and information 
mediums (Lai, Chib, Ling 2018, p.734). It is also shown that the Vietnamese often use a variety 
of media channels for updates in disaster related situations and independently search for 
information (ibid, p.747). On the contrary, findings also suggest that the information literacy 
among upper secondary school students is not at a sufficient level and also reveal gender 
differences (Ngo, Pickard & Walton 2019, p.453). Vietnam has had a rapid technical 
development in the last decade, see Table 2. The increasing use of the internet and social media, 
has led to Vietnamese adopting knowledge and literacy to include the technology in their lives 
(Duong 2019, p.23). Social media is used mainly to maintain relationships, as well as for 
shopping and entertainment (ibid, p. 18). The state softened their attitude towards social 
networks, and Facebook in particular, this because of the major spread and force it constituted 
among the population. Since then, a Facebook-page for the government and for the Ministry of 
Health has been launched. The fan page, Bộ Trưởng Bộ Y Tế, was announced on January 15th 
2015 to enable it to connect effectively and rapidly with users, to date - they have almost 364 
000 followers (ibid, p.27). The Vietnamese government (Thông tin Chính phủ) officially 
announced the launch of its page on Facebook on 21 October 2015, as of May 20th, 2020 they 
have 875 000 followers. The page is used for press releases and promotion of activities. 
Facebook, which was earlier prohibited and discredited by the government was now publicly 
celebrated as a ‘an essential and unprohibited need’ that constitutes a ‘sharper communication 
tools than conventional methods’ (ibid, p.27). 
Today, more than 70% of Vietnam's population have internet access. With 58 million 
accounts on Facebook, they make up the seventh largest nationality present on the platform. 62 
million Vietnamese have Google-accounts, something which is banned in their political equal 
communist one-party state China. This is a major difference. In reference to this, for example 
not being transparent with an outbreak of an infectious disease would only do harm to the 
legitimacy of the government, as people have the possibility to freely look for information from 
international media channels as well as contacting peers abroad. This is also the road Prime 
Minister Phúc has chosen, transparency and proactivity (Phuong Nguyen 2020). 
When surveying Vietnamese youth about their media habits many reply that their 
primary news source is the internet, preferably online news channels. While those aged 35 and 
older state television to be their main news source (74% of respondents), while only 49% of 
those aged 15-34 discloses the same, the difference is striking. The growing availability of 
mobile phones with web browsers is pointed out as a main driver for this development (AIB 
News 2015). There are several projects serving to broaden access to the internet for a larger 
part of Vietnam's inhabitants, mainly to connect rural households of which only 1% had internet 
access in 2008, when the number for the whole country was almost 30%. This is particularly 
relevant as 70% is Vietnam's population were inhabitants of rural areas in 2008 (Tuan 2011, 
p.7). The Vietnamese government has established strategies in the aim to develop the country's 
ICT access. Programs has been executed in order to narrow the digital divide gap between 
urban and rural areas, and to promote socioeconomic development (ibid, p.24). 
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Table 2. The development over time for ICT access in Vietnam 
Fixed broadband subscriptions 
2002 1 076 
2010 3 700 000 
2018 (13,6 per 100 inhabitants) 13 000 000 
Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions 
2002 1 900 000 
2010 111 600 000 
2018 (147,2 per 100 inhabitants) 140 600 000 
Individuals using the internet 
2002 2% 
2010 31% 
2018 70% 
Fixed telephone subscriptions 
2002 3 900 000 
2010 14 400 000 
2018  (4,5 per 100 inhabitants) 4 300 000 
Source: ITU (2020b) 
Key findings Vietnam - The Vietnam Integrated National Operational 
Program on Avian Influenza, Pandemic Preparedness and Emerging 
Infectious Diseases (AIPED) 2011-2015 
For complete empirical data, see Appendix 4. 
 
In the Vietnamese preparedness plan, substantial progress when it comes to public awareness 
and behavioral change among the population is expressed. Models to evaluate these practices 
will be examined to further perfect and develop the most successful approaches, with the main 
focus being of public awareness through communication and developing a new and revised 
communication plan. Services and infrastructure will be expanded to better support 
communication practices. For example, a better system for informing medical staff and the 
general public about actions during a pandemic has been established, information needs to flow 
from the central to the local level and the opposite. A variety of stakeholders, public, private 
and civil society, from all levels, needs to be involved in the process and continually brief and 
updated on the current situation, including the Ministry of Information and Communication. It 
is essential to have a transdisciplinary approach to prevent and manage communicable diseases. 
Relevant information needs to be translated into policies and programs in a flexible manner 
that adapts to the evolution of the local epidemic and disseminated through communication 
efforts and social marketing. Responsibilities among the stakeholders involved needs to be 
clear. It is underlined that risk communication practices during a health emergency needs 
evaluation and further development. 
Channels used for risk communication include; print, electronic and media materials, 
mass media, targeted text messages, health managers and health workers in local communities, 
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local dissemination campaigns, annual campaigns during high risk periods and school based 
educational campaigns. Messages conveyed to the public should include; handwashing 
practices, food safety, livestock management, information on ongoing outbreak and 
transmissions patterns. Transparency will be ensured through close collaboration with 
transnational organizations. A timely risk communication is essential, and an improved 
coordination and establishment of reliable mechanisms in cooperation with the media will 
contribute to this cause. Engagement with the local community such as community leaders, 
local media and workers from key occupations are important to address rumors and 
misinformation to improve compliance in communities. Social support systems need to be 
enforced to ensure that it is possible for communities to comply with recommendations. 
Government communication efforts needs to be evaluated and measured as compliance is 
corresponding directly with how well developed these are. 
Communication efforts needs to consider and target that poverty playing a role in 
inaccurate livestock management and thereby increased exposure to risk is a driving factor 
behind increasing infections. RRT should support local communities in their management of 
an outbreak, especially in poor and isolated areas. There is important to maintain internet 
networks and provide computers in all areas for accurate surveillance possibilities.  
Communication strategies and behavior change campaigns needs to be sensitive to 
acceptance and risk perception of the public and understanding of the local context in 
communities, this to enable a bottom up planning approach and to take provincial priorities 
into consideration. Especially individuals involved in the poultry industry needs to be targeted. 
Organizations active to reach vulnerable groups should be involved, such as the Vietnam Red 
Cross and various unions. Target groups with a low risk perception require extra 
communication efforts. 
Key findings Vietnam - H5N1 & A(H1N1)pdm09 
For complete empirical data, see Appendix 5. 
 
The Vietnamese government has cooperated and communication closely with strategies with 
external partners to shape their response to these outbreaks. Also, national organization such 
as the Vietnam Women's Union and Father Front of Vietnam has been incorporated to 
disseminate information, such as distributing leaflets and leading workshops to target groups 
in local communities, in a timely manner. Because of their social capital among communities 
they became a trusted source and bolster local ownership, this strengthened the public 
compliance. However, the collaboration between governmental and non-governmental 
organization has been criticized, for leading to confusion, inconsistent messages and low 
impact results because of lacking coordination and communication. Evaluation of activities and 
behavioral surveillance needs to be further strengthened to insure sensitivity in the local 
context. Other channels used were; local radio stations, local community loudspeakers, flyers, 
TV, newspapers and meetings. Mass media is an efficient source of communication because of 
its close relationship with the state and its strong influence on behavioral changes. The 
weakness of mass media in rural areas, however, demands a different approach and made 
communication rely more heavily on other mediums such as the local authorities, health care 
institutions, educational institutions, military units and Father Front of Vietnam and its 
affiliates. Messages included: safe handling of livestock, basic health hygiene such as hand 
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washing and cough and sneezing etiquette, with the main focus being on preventive measures. 
Some evidence that this was adapted among local communities was found in relation to Avian 
Influenza, this could include using gloves for livestock management or fencing of poultry. Very 
few messages related directly to pandemic influenza and improvement regarding respiratory 
health hygiene and when to seek medical care is needed. The 2009 law on Prevention and 
Control of Infectious Disease require information, education and communication 
responsibilities to be met from various ministries. Targeted risk communication messages were 
also implemented. The public were satisfied with the clear and timely communication. Timing, 
targeting the right audience and generation of emergency messages is essential and a 
responsibility of MARD and MOH. Regarding the outreach of the communication a study has 
shown that 75% had good knowledge on pandemic influenza personal prevention, while only 
37% had good knowledge on community prevention. Hand washing and wearing a facemask 
was perceived as the most effective preventive measure among 97%. School education 
programs is regarded one of the most successful and effective strategy in raising public 
awareness. However, even if knowledge was high community preventive actions were poor. 
Even though excessive effort is made for a local outreach, many information materials are not 
available in local languages. A study mapping response time for implementing measures 
showed that when cases were identified in the Asian region communications with health 
officials from the Mekong Basin region was initiated. When domestic cases were identified; A 
spokesperson were identified and consistent risk communication to general and targeted public 
continued to avoid panic.  
Key findings Vietnam - Covid-19 
For complete empirical data, see Appendix 6. 
 
62% of the Vietnamese population find that their government has enforced the right amount of 
restrictions in its response to covid-19, which is a higher rate than South Korea. The Prime 
Minister Phúc and other political leaders has enjoyed strong support from the public, the 
Vietnamese are among the strongest supporters globally of their government’s response 
measures. Even before covid-19 was categorized as a pandemic by WHO, Vietnam launched a 
smartphone application where users could report their medical condition. The communication 
channels used during the pandemic; teleconferences with 700 hospitals nationwide, local 
centers for disease control and prevention, government run media campaign including a viral 
music video, regular SMS updates, a live chat, social media channels (Facebook-page, Zalo-
page, TikTok-site with a dance challenge, YouTube, Instagram), private sector networks, 
informational videos in sign language, local influencers, websites, smartphone applications 
which has been used for quick information dissemination and to address rumors, also partly by 
legal actions against people spreading inaccurate information. State media has constantly 
followed and reported around the development of severely affected regions. The rhetoric used 
to distribute information from the government can be categorized as a war rhetoric with lines 
such as “fighting the epidemic is like fighting against the enemy”. Messages distributed to the 
public includes personal protective measures, do’s and don'ts, updates on the progress of 
hospitalized patients, as well as patient’s origin and entrance to Vietnam, reports from other 
countries progress and reports regarding Vietnam’s success in their response.  
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The communication from the government has been proactive and detailed, this was 
questioned as some point, but the government responded to this criticism by referring to the 
close cooperation with external partners such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
USA and the open data being shared globally. Engagement and solidarity of citizens has been 
prevalent during the pandemic. Social distancing, wearing face masks, quarantine has been 
well adhered to. This can partly be attributed to the experience the Vietnamese people has with 
similar situation along with the sense of national coherence in fighting a “common enemy”. 
However, a driver is also the well-established “loyal reporting system” that is being practiced 
by party members throughout the whole society. 
Analysis & interpretation 
The theoretical framework has highlighted the risk of vulnerable groups with a lower SES can 
possibly be subjects to exclusion in disaster situations. This trough a discrepancy in lifestyle, 
culture, perception and possibilities from those with a higher SES (Viswanath 2006, p.222; 
Taylor-Clark, Viswanath & Blendon 2010, p.222 & 224). The importance of highlighting the 
situation for vulnerable population in this context is apparent. Firstly, because a novel influenza 
outbreak is to be considered as a disaster in terms of the threat it poses. Secondly, the 
importance of compliance to non-pharmaceutical interventions from the population, imposed 
or recommended by the state, are essential for mitigating further transmission of the virus. 
Compliance depends on exposure and responsiveness to such information (Taylor-Clark, 
Viswanath & Blendon 2010, p.226-227; Levi & Stoker 2000, p.492; Kampen, Van De Walle 
& Bouckaert 2006, p.387). 
ICT Access of the South Korean people 
Both the Digital Divide theory and the Structural Influence Model (SIM) points out how SES, 
access and literacy concerning communication technology correlates. Already in the mid 80’s 
South Korea had a clear approach regarding citizen’s access to the internet that coincides with 
both the Digital Divide theory and SIM, by educating rural households and agricultural workers 
in an attempt to bridge the divide (Park & Jae Kim 2014, p.72-73). However, by being a 
technological pioneer and a high-income country with a widespread access of fixed broadband, 
mobile cellular telephone prescriptions and individuals using the internet, see Table 1, patterns 
of exclusion can be reinforced. The Digital Divide theory emphasizes the bias of assuming 
general access to technology. Other modes of communications could be neglected in striving 
mainly for the development of modern communication solutions and thereby neglect the 
minority of individuals without access or with low skills or quality of usage in a greater 
disadvantage. In the influenza preparedness plan of South Korea from 2006 development of 
new infrastructure is a main goal, suggesting a bias towards technical solutions for risk 
communication. In the case of South Korea, 96% of the population had access to the internet 
in 2018 which means that 4% or 2 million people lack access and thereby risk exclusion (ITU 
2020b).  
Park and Jae Kim emphasize that the traditional digital gap in access has minimized but 
the second-level digital divide which refers to technological illiteracy has not followed 
accordingly. The groups exposed to the second-level digital divide is mainly represented by 
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people with disabilities, low income and the elderly, the largest gap currently affecting fishery- 
and agricultural workers. Meaning that the South Korean government's effort to narrow the 
digital divide gap from the 80’s onwards has only partly been successful. However, some 
groups remain excluded and the problem has rather shifted to the second level digital divide, 
meaning lack of skills and quality of use despite technological access (Park & Jae Kim 2014, 
p.77-80).  
In June 2007, it was noted that only 31% of South Korean households with an income 
below 1 million won (~US$ 100) owned a computer, there was also differences based on 
education level, age and gender (Kim & Jeong 2010, p. 44-46). During the A(H1N1)pdm09 
outbreak differences was visible regarding the spread of the virus. People connected to the 
Medical Aid Program (low SES) became more severely ill than those with National Health 
Insurance, the reason to this could be insufficient hygiene, low access to- and late medical 
treatment. Also, rural areas and provinces had a higher incidence of A(H1N1)pdm09, for both 
younger and older patients, even though the infection was on average impacting young people 
at a higher rate and the rural areas have mainly elderly residents (Choi et al. p.1-4 & 8).  Hence, 
the combination of these findings suggests a connection between people affected by second 
level digital divide being lower income, elderly, fishery- and agricultural workers. In addition 
70% of low income households did not own a computer in 2007, people supported by the 
Medical Aid program (low SES) had a higher incidence and severity during the 
A(H1N1)pdm09 outbreak as well as a higher incidence in rural areas. SIM connects 
communication inequalities with a lower practice of preventive behavior as a result of lower 
risk perception and awareness. This in turn deriving from a lowered access or comprehension 
of risk communication messages. The explanation can according to the Digital Divide theory 
be attributed to information inequality due to the lower SES of this group in South Korea. This 
indicates a structural problem which increases health risks for vulnerable groups.  
ICT Access of the Vietnamese people  
The digital divide gap in Vietnam has been and is still a challenge, in 2008 70% of the 
population lived in rural areas and only 1% of the rural households had internet access, the total 
access of the whole country was 30% (Tuan 2011, p.7). However, Vietnam as a lower middle-
income country has had a tremendously rapid technological development the past decade, see 
Table 2. One of the reasons to this development being the government initiated digital divide 
projects (ibid, p.24). This indicates awareness of the risk of exclusion of lower SES groups. 
With mobile technology being dominant today but a rapid upscaling of social media usage 
stands out in Vietnam's communication technology landscape. This also means that risk 
communication messages are increasingly conveyed through social media channels even if 
31% or 29 million of the Vietnamese population still lacked access to the internet in 2018 (ITU 
2020b). Digital Divide theory would propose the same risk here as in South Korea, expansion 
and bias towards newer technology will possibly widen the gap even more. Also, SIM proposes 
that these 29 million people could have disadvantages in PHEP due to their SES and thereby 
be more vulnerable to influenza transmission. 
During the outbreak of Avian Influenza in 2003 a connection was found between 
infected cases and handling of poultry (Kudo et al. 2012, p.142) With preventative actions with 
attention to socioeconomic and rural determinants in focus, the preparedness plan of Vietnam 
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acknowledges that poultry workers are at a greater risk of being infected with Avian Influenza. 
The response from the government being vaccination of poultry and campaigns on safe 
handling of livestock as well as targeted behavior changing communication programs. This 
group of risk often live in poor and remote areas, including many of 54 ethnic minority groups 
(MARD & MOH 2011, p.7, 23 & 45; McKinn et al. 2017, p.2; Målqvist et al. 2013 p.2; Fritzen 
2007, p.76). SIM correlates well with this strategy and in theory this should lead to a better 
protection and safeguarding of vulnerable groups. What is also understood as central in 
accordance with SIM is to tackle low risk perception among different key target groups, which 
otherwise could lead to lowered PHEP (MARD & MOH 2011, p.60-61).  
Risk communication strategy and outcomes  
Messages 
The preparedness plan of South Korea states that the public and outbound travelers should be 
educated on preventive measures and protective behavior such as hand washing and cough 
etiquette (MOHW & KCDC 2006, p.83, 88 & 109). Information regarding domestic and 
foreign influenza outbreaks should be communicated to foster awareness (ibid, p.80, 84 & 100) 
During the A(H1N1)pdm09 outbreak and MERS outbreak in South Korea no empirical data 
could be found that shows what messages was actually communicated. During the covid-19 
outbreak however, messages included warning messages on movements of infected individuals 
combined with their age and gender, which rooms of a building they visited and if they were 
wearing a face mask or not. Information to avoid large gatherings, what symptoms to be 
attentive to, what pharmacies had protective in stock and where to go for testing (Zastrow 2020; 
Klingebiel 2020). 
In Vietnam, the preparedness plan highlights that hand washing, hygiene promotion 
and food safety information needs to be communicated (MARD & MOH 2011, p.23). Also, 
seasonal risks connected to livestock management along with safe practices on cooking and 
handling dead and live poultry as well as knowledge on disease transmission patterns (ibid, 
p.45 & 60). The goal for communicated messages is ultimately long lasting behavioral changes 
that result in improved shielding from disease (ibid, p.7 & 85). Messages conveyed during the 
Avian Influenza and A(H1N1)pdm09 in Vietnam were corresponding to the strategy in 
conveying messages on handling of livestock (for example fencing poultry and quarantining 
new poultry), health hygiene and protection when sneezing/coughing. (Hanvoravongchai et al. 
2010, p.7; Waisbord, Michaelides & Rasmuson 2008, p.203). However, with the not fully 
functioning cooperation between involved stakeholders led to mixed and party inaccurate 
messages that created confusion and wasted resources (Hai 2009, p.55-56).  
During the covid-19 pandemic, the Vietnamese government have used war rhetoric to 
describe the virus battle with expressions such as “fighting the virus is like fighting an enemy” 
(Vu & Tran 2020; Jones 2020). The number of and detailed status on every covid-19 patient 
has been disclosed, underlining the few cases present in the country and also the success of 
treatment (Phuong Nguyen 2020; Thông tin Chính phủ 2020a). Facebook is a way for the 
government to present information in a timely manner (La et al. 2020, p.13). Postings on 
Facebook underline the foreign origin of the transmission and it also highlights news on the 
virus spread in other countries as well as tributes to the Vietnamese pandemic response from 
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foreign news media (Thông tin Chính phủ 2020a; Thông tin Chính phủ 2020b; Thông tin Chính 
phủ 2020c). 
According to Olofsson and Öhman, there is no consensus around what type of 
information risk communication messages should entail to foster trust other than the 
correctness of information (Olofsson & Öhman 2009, p.88-89). The sources of this study show 
that in relation to the covid-pandemic there is no reason to doubt the information communicated 
by either Vietnam or South Korea, only the fact that the pandemic is ongoing and evidence and 
reports are being published at a higher speed may be leading to information insecurities (Le 
2020). South Korea learned the hard way that messages need to include the right information 
during the MERS-outbreak in 2015 (Yang & Lee 2020). The Vietnamese rhetoric and focus on 
foreign transmission being the main reason for covid-19 cases as well as explicitly stating the 
status of patients may be connected to creating the sense of solidarity and confidence among 
the population. The theory points out this as a successful strategy to enhance trust, ensure 
transparency and thereby also strengthen compliance, this can have a tremendous impact in the 
function of the public health system and response to an influenza outbreak (Citrin & Stoker 
2018, p.59; Ellinas & Lamprianou 2014, p.248; Gudi & Tiwari 2020, p.108; Cairns, de Andrade 
& MacDonald 2013, p.1550 & 1557). 
Channels 
Television, radio and internet, as well as books and newspapers are the common channels for 
risk communication (Olofsson & Öhman 2009, p.71). Risk communication during a crisis 
needs to be “understandable, timely, transparent and coordinated’ as well as foster a dialogue 
with the public (COMBI 2012, p.xii; Cairns, de Andrade & MacDonald 2013, p.1555). The 
risk communication theory further emphasizes the importance of being aware of people's 
different needs and desires in receiving and complying to information. This should be taken 
into account when designing the risk communication message and in the choice of 
communication channels. Both studied countries has utilized multiple channels for conveying 
risk communication messages, for example during the A(H1N1)pdm09 outbreak in Vietnam, 
88% stated that they received information through flyers, radio, TV spots, newspaper, and 
meetings (Ngan et al. 2011, p.1). During the ongoing covid-19 pandemic many modern 
communication tools has been used in Vietnam. For example, Tiktok and YouTube has been 
used to widely promote handwashing in an appealing way, mainly aimed for children and 
teenagers, but a wide spread of this more lighthearted messages has been noticeable worldwide. 
Sign language stop motion videos has been distributed through various online platforms 
including the official website of the government (Flowers 2020). In Hanoi, a smart app has 
been launched to inform about preventive measures and live updates on virus transmission. 
Also, text messages have been distributed regularly to promote personal protective measures 
as well as a live chat to respond to questions from the public (Jones 2020; La et al. 2020, p. 9). 
A diverse public and also vulnerable subgroups, such as disabled, are identified through this 
wide spread of channels and content. No empirical data of the earlier visible strategy to reach 
out locally through local actors has been found, this may be a result of the ongoing status of 
the pandemic and that such risk communication methods have not yet been noticed. Viral social 
media content on the other hand is visible and has a quick and easy outreach because of its 
form. However, vulnerable groups in the sense of lower SES and possibly a limited ICT access 
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will not benefit from this more modern approach that is appearing to shift in Vietnam's risk 
communication strategy over time. 
The risk communication strategy and empirical data regarding South Korea suggests 
that they use a wide range of communication channels with two-way-communication 
possibilities through operated hotlines, but do not identify vulnerable subgroups among the 
population. It is mentioned that information should be easy to comprehend and that local 
authorities should be a source of information, but how this is ensured to reach lower SES groups 
or vulnerable populations is not further explained (MOHW & KCDC 2006, p.28 & 85). The 
empirical data shows that groups with a lower education level consume entertainment media 
to a larger extent in South Korea (Oh, Paek & Hove 2015, p.26). 89% claimed to have obtained 
information from the TV, radio, and newspapers during A(H1N1)pdm09 outbreak in South 
Korea (Kim et al. 2014, p.18). Except for news briefings being sign language interpreted 
(Arirang News 2020). The empirical data included in this study shows merely a request for 
efforts with special consideration for vulnerable groups which risk communication theory 
supports as an essential priority in order to achieve desired public compliance and literacy (Lee, 
Ju & You 2019, p.9; Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger 2011, p.47-48). However, during the covid-19 
pandemic targeted text messages has been conveyed, even though the major risk 
communication channel has been mobile application notifications based on people's GPS 
position (Klingebiel 2020; Zastrow 2020; Chung & Soh 2020). This means a wide 
dissemination reach in relation the ICT access in South Korea, see Table 1. 
In comparison, the strategy of Vietnam identifies drivers to increased outbreak and 
transmission risks as poverty and occupational hazards. Measures such as using local networks 
for information dissemination and education certain vulnerable groups are performed (MARD 
& MOH 2011, p.85; Waisbord, Michaelides & Rasmuson 2008, p.203). Considering 86% of 
the population living in poverty belong to ethnic minority groups in Vietnam it’s vital that the 
government recognizes this in their risk communication strategies. Also, targeted campaigns 
through text messages for specific subgroups is regarded having a good coverage as mobile 
subscription rate in Vietnam is very high, see Table 2 (MARD & MOH 2011, p.60). Other 
infrastructure such as internet network capacity for local facilities is also observed and it is 
described in detail what type of equipment is needed to enhance network access (ibid, p.137). 
The preparedness plan also recognizes other levels of SES, gender related inequalities can 
constitute differences in livelihood practices, access to information and access to local 
networks (ibid, p.61) The essentiality of social capital, which local networks possess is used as 
a resource in Vietnam's influenza response. This is highlighted by Chuang et al. with emphasize 
on health protective behavior being mediated through social capital (Chuang et al. 2015, p.2). 
The empirical data from the covid-19 outbreak shows that private sector networks were 
utilized, for example companies for both white- and blue-collar workers (Flowers 2020). 
During the Avian Influenza and the A(H1N1)pdm09 outbreak, a low percentage of the 
Vietnamese population had internet access. Mass media coverage and outreach was very weak 
in rural areas (Hai 2009, p.56). This made the government use other risk communication 
strategies. The effort of risk communication from the state were targeted risk communication 
messages conveyed and conducted partly through the Vietnam Women's Union during the 
Avian Influenza outbreak to reach all provinces and to overcome communication barriers 
(Waisbord, Michaelides & Rasmuson 2008, p.203; Moore & Dausey 2011, p.5). The use of 
communal loudspeakers during the Avian influenza, was also helping to overcome the fact that 
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many rural inhabitants lack modern communication equipment (Waisbord, Michaelides & 
Rasmuson 2008, p.204). In relation to SIM this means that the possibility for PHEP for the 
people increased by outreach through this channel but does not respond to weather SES was 
taken in consideration and thereby reaching the most vulnerable. In the context of the Avian 
Influenza a survey disclosed that among 304 respondents, 75% had good knowledge about 
personal protective measures and that only 37% had good knowledge on community prevention 
(Ngan et al. 2011, p.1). Målqvist et al. underlines the importance of information in local 
languages being available, but if this was a barrier in the context of Avian Influenza is not clear 
(Målqvist et al. 2013, p.16). Language discrepancies is one of the main barriers for exposure 
and response to risk communication messages (Viswanath 2006, p.224). 
The need to understand and adapt to the local context, as highlighted by Ulmer, Sellnow 
& Seeger as a culturally-sensitive approach is recognized in the preparedness plan of Vietnam 
(Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger 2011 p.47-48), its explicitly stated that communication efforts needs 
to move beyond uniform messages to a homogenous population and instead be targeted 
messages towards certain exposed groups, before and during the outbreak (MARD & MOH 
2011, p.21 & 85). A culturally-centered approach can also be identified, as a ‘bottom up-
approach’ in regard to planning for risk communication and executing projects on local level. 
In combination with assessing the success of risk communication messages, regarding the 
mode of delivery and their impact on behavioral change (ibid, p.23 & 59). Ulmer, Sellnow & 
Seeger further emphasize the importance to establish these relationships prior to an outbreak 
to ensure effective communication during a crisis (Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger 2011, p.47-48). 
It is underlined the importance of adapting messages to the local context and using cooperation 
partners such as the Vietnam Red Cross to convey risk communication messages (MARD & 
MOH 2011, p.85). These efforts can according to the empirical material have been a key to 
creating trust among the local populations, because the risk communication messages were 
conveyed by known individuals with local cultural knowledge. Empirical support was found 
in that behavior changes in livestock management was successfully changed to a safer practices 
that prevented spread and/or outbreaks of disease (Waisbord, Michaelides & Rasmuson 2008, 
p.209). This is essential to point out as some empirical findings suggest ethnic minorities during 
normal circumstances are being discriminated in the health context in various ways and that 
generic information and handbooks been distributed although they are not always possible for 
the recipient to interpret. Communication between health staff and ethnic minorities has in 
some cases been difficult because of language barriers and ethnic minorities has also been less 
frequent users of healthcare services (McKinn et al. 2017, p.8; Målqvist et al. 2013 p.1 & 6). 
No empirical findings have confirmed this in an influenza outbreak context but there is a 
possibility that the same discrimination is present in this context as well. 
Trust and Transparency 
“Compliance can in many ways be interlinked with trust, as the public tends to respond 
positively to measures in accordance with the authorities recommendations or regulations if 
they trust their government. This enables the government to limit or make changes in people's 
everyday life without coercion” (Kampen, Van De Walle & Bouckaert 2006, p.387; Levi & 
Stoker 2000, p.492). Thereof, governmental trust is vital in the context of risk communication 
and is a result of governmental transparency (Cairns, de Andrade & MacDonald 2013, p.1558; 
Olofsson & Öhman 2009, p.88-89). The compliance toward the governmental restrictions 
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during a novel virus outbreak will be even more effective if the public trust is high before an 
outbreak (Chuang et al. 2015, p.7). The public trust is linked to people's political life. People 
who distrust the government are not satisfied with policy choices. Also, political scandals, war, 
critical media messages conveyed to the public, politicians portrayed as selfish can contribute 
negatively (Levi & Stoker 2000, p.480-481). 
This can be seen in the case of South Korea when the public trust towards the 
government in general are low due to the many corruption scandals within the state apparatus, 
the public have higher trust in the public health system (Tan & Tambyah 2011, p.368-369). 
However, the Government Trust theory emphasizes that trust can increase during an event of 
an “external threat”, such as an influenza epidemic, because of people turning to the 
government for guidance and support (Citrin & Stoker 2018, p.59). Statistics during the covid-
19 pandemic show trust among the citizens towards the governmental management of the 
pandemic (Dalia Research 2020). It’s clear that the South Korean government has embraces 
the critics from the MERS outbreak (Zastrow 2020) when they failed to disclose important 
information to the public which caused trust to decline and hysteria arose, which also 
contributed to the spread of the epidemic (Choi et al. 2015 p.487; Kim & Jung 2017, p.1; Jang 
et al. 2019, p.2).  
In their influenza preparedness plan the South Korean government points out that the 
main goal is to build trust through acting with consistency, using one spokesperson and to 
rapidly provide the general public with updated information, which goes along with both the 
Government trust and Risk Communication theory (MOHW & KCDC 2006, p.23). Despite the 
promising approach in the preparedness plan evidence from the MERS outbreak show another 
side of the coin. The government are aware of the unstable public trust and has implemented 
efforts to restore it (Kim, Lee & Lee 2018, p. 73). The successful management of the covid-19 
is one clear evidence of the governmental efforts which also corresponds better to the objectives 
of their influenza preparedness plan. This has resulted in desired public compliance and a better 
control of the transmission (Zastrow 2020). 
As Vietnam is considered a communist-one-party state the reliability of general public 
trust towards the government tolerates to be questioned. In a survey measuring trust within the 
state apparatus the Vietnamese public did not participate in the questions regarding trust 
towards the political institutions. They did, however, show high trust in the education system, 
public health system and in the media (Tan & Tambyah 2011, p. 368-369). Moreover, 84% of 
the participants in a survey expressed trust and satisfaction regarding government risk 
communication during the A(H1N1)pdm09 outbreak (Ngan et al. 2011, p.1). In a survey 
regarding the public opinion on the governmental response during the covid-19 pandemic, 64% 
of the Vietnamese participants thought the government is doing “the right amount” which is a 
higher rate than South Korea and the highest among all 45 surveyed countries (Dalia Research 
2020). If these optimistic numbers are a result of strong nationalism and general trust towards 
the government or a result of fear or obligation towards the state is difficult to determine. 
According to the government trust theory, trust is developed through policy expectations and 
people being satisfied by policies implemented by the government (Im et al. 2012, p.746-747). 
The general trust has increased since the Đổi Mới reform in 1986 when the economy in the 
country opened up and the public welfare increased (Nguyen 2016, p.33-34).  
In their pandemic preparedness plan the government states that timely communication 
of accurate information, public awareness and behavioral change are the primary objectives. 
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They show awareness on the importance of flexibility in their response to an outbreak with 
focus on the local context in the development of the communication models (MARD & MOH 
2011 p.21 & 83). They also point out their close cooperation with transnational organizations 
in order to ensure transparency (ibid, p. viii, 78). During the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic 
Vietnam began with communication collaboration with nearby countries and other external 
partners when the virus reached the Asian region. With detection of the first domestic case, a 
spokesperson was appointed, conveyed consistent public risk communication in general and to 
targeted populations with the aim to avoid public panic (Moore & Dausey 2011, p.5).  
The influenza preparedness plan has a holistic, multisectoral and transdisciplinary 
approach with a clear focus on preventative actions to mitigate the occurrence of an outbreak. 
The plan also includes clear evaluations on lessons learned and achieved goals regarding risk 
communication from the previous influenza preparedness plan as well as future challenges to 
be aware of and weak points that need further development, see Appendix 4. According to both 
the Government Trust theory and the Risk communication the government show efforts to be 
transparent in their management and communication. By actively work with preventative 
initiatives the government show responsiveness and protectiveness towards the public which 
could engage a better public trust.  
The Vietnamese government show evidence of having a culturally-sensitive approach 
when they point out that public risk perceptions of the protective measures vary among the 
public and is important to refine during pandemic communications (MARD & MOH 2011, 
p.23). Chuang et al. further explains how social ties plays a crucial role in peoples response 
and shielding from external threats, which the government also pay close attention too when 
they highlight the difficulties regarding behavioral change and how this is influenced of local 
perceptions. Meaning that information and education communication (IEC) and behavior 
change communication (BCC) need to be adapted to the local context (ibid, p.85). This 
awareness can further result in development of a greater public trust in general but also among 
the ethnic minorities if the locally adapted incitements are successful. The theory of Risk 
Communication explains that to foster a dialogue between stakeholders and the public is central 
to show empathy to the public experiences. Empirical materials from the Avian Influenza 
confirms that some locally adapted communication initiative by the government in 
collaboration with local stakeholders, organizations and unions resulting in good compliance 
among target groups (Waisbord, Michaelides & Rasmuson 2009, p.203-204 & 209-210). 
However, other empirical evidence states an unsuccessful communication initiative due to 
inadequate cooperation between the government and NGO’s which among other things led to 
confusion among the public and low-impact results. This is calling for improved monitoring 
and evaluation of activities and behavioral surveillance (Hai 2009, p.55-56).   
During the covid-19 pandemic, Vietnam has continued to initiate proactive and 
transparent communication. The governmental management has received great support from 
the public who compared to other countries show the greatest trust towards their government 
(Vu & Tran 2020; Phuong Nguyen 2020; Le et al. 2020, p.17). The key to Vietnam’s success 
in combating covid-19 can to a large part be attributed to the effective governmental leadership 
along with the engagement and solidarity of citizens (Le 2020). Seen by Governmental trust 
theory and the Risk Communication theory point of view Vietnam has acted correctly in order 
to engage and maintain trust in their risk communication efforts.  
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Compliance 
The effect of the messages is according to Olofsson and Öhman an explicit in information 
transfer, attitude and/or behavior change and decreasing fear in the long and short term. In 
regard to risk communication hopefully leading to compliance (Olofsson & Öhman 2009, 
p.71). The South Korean government did not address how they need to act to foster compliance 
in their preparedness plan. What is more clearly addressed in the preparedness plan is the 
cultivation of trust, see the importance of trust explained above under Trust & Transparency. 
Apparent during the A(H1N1)pdm09 outbreak and MERS outbreak is, that the public took 
correct measures in accordance with recommendations such as self-isolating (voluntarily) at 
home and wearing a face mask. Even though, communication on MERS initially failed in 2015, 
empirical data show that today during the covid-19 pandemic, the South Korean people might 
show increasing levels of compliance because of their earlier experiences with disease outbreak 
and governmental guidelines and restrictions (Choi et al. 2015 p.487; Kim & Jung 2017, p.1; 
Jang et al. 2019, p.2; Chung & Soh 2020).  
According to SIM, public communications can influence health by raising awareness, 
providing information, and reinforcing knowledge and behaviors. However, communication 
inequalities can affect people’s attention to, processing of, and acting upon health information 
and the consequential behavioral outcomes, thereby increase the gap among social groups (Lin 
et al. 2014b, p.50). Higher education level, independence in seeking information and 
information processing had a direct link to protective measures such as hand hygiene and 
avoidance of high-risk areas such as hospitals during the MERS outbreak in South Korea (Lee, 
Ju & You 2019, p.5, 6 & 9). However, the empirical results do not disclose that particular 
campaigns to increase these behavior among vulnerable groups was made, as this group may 
not have the same ability to search for and process health information (Viswanath 2006, p.249). 
Higher levels of fear and concern for infections along with reduced transmission 
behavior increased compliance during both A(H1N1)pdm09 and MERS (Kim et al. 2014, p.19; 
Jang et al. 2019, p.4). Related to the theory on risk perception, ‘access’ to the right type in 
information is required, followed by ‘understanding/processing’ and ‘utilization’ to increase 
possibility of shielding, higher SES groups has a higher ability in this matter (Taylor-Clark, 
Viswanath & Blendon 2010, p.226-227). Empirical data supports that rural areas and a low 
individual economic status in South Korea experienced a higher incidence of disease as well 
as increased disease severity (Choi et al. 2012, p.1-4 & 8). Also, unemployed and blue-collar 
workers had lower compliance rates of health protective practices recommended (Jang et al. 
2019, p.4). This is an indication, but to clearly draw a conclusion on lower compliance 
mediated through failure to accommodate needs in terms of risk communication would require 
a wider empirical data set. 
The preparedness plan of Vietnam addresses that it is important to evaluate the 
compliance of the people to improve and learn from earlier experiences, not assuming that 
compliance will be at a sufficient level. Compliance should be assured through strategic 
partners reporting unusual occurrences and actively engaging in rumor surveillance (MARD & 
MOH 2011, p.51) The state being a one party socialist state makes the balance between 
compliance as informed choice and compliance because of not risking being labeled an 
“unusual occurrence” is fine. The political situation may influence compliance levels in this 
matter. As a network of “loyal party members” is constantly contributing to informing the 
government (Jones 2020). 
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Compliance has been showed as mediated through local networks such as the VWU, 
because of the local knowledge they possess. This can be attributed a culturally-sensitive 
approach (Waisbord, Michaelides & Rasmuson 2008, p.209; Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger 2011 
p.47-48). It was shown that women participating in workshops held by VWU adapted measures 
such as fencing poultry and using protective equipment when handling dead or sick poultry 
during the Avian Influenza (Waisbord, Michaelides & Rasmuson 2008, p.203-204). Although 
during A(H1N1)pdm09 a good knowledge regarding community prevention, practices of these 
preventional methods was low. Education programs was proven successful, but the compliance 
still lacked. More empirical data would be needed to understand the processes behind this “gap” 
in knowledge and practice in the context of this outbreak (Ngan et al. 2011, p.1).  
It is acknowledged in Vietnam's preparedness plan that social support needs to be in 
place for people to be better able to comply with measures such as home isolation (MARD & 
MOH 2011, p.57). This indicates awareness in accordance with the risk communication theory, 
that physical barriers or limited options may be the reason why people don’t comply with 
recommendations (Viswanath 2006, p.222). However, the unidirectional communicational 
structure has been appointed some blame regarding the absence of behavior changes. 
Approaches not being diverse enough to accommodate the needs of a homogenous populations, 
especially those of ethnic minority groups. (McKinn et al. 2017, p.8; Målqvist et al. 2013, p.1). 
The empirical data on compliance during the covid-19 pandemic in Vietnam shows another 
image. It found that compliance is high with measures such as social distancing and wearing 
face masks (Le 2020). One reason being appointed, as well as for South Korea, that the 
population is very used to handling infectious disease outbreaks. Also, the feeling of “beating 
the enemy (the virus) together” is making the public more compliant (Jones 2020). As 
mentioned earlier, the reporting system that makes every neighbor a possible informant of 
ignored recommendations is also a possible driver (ibid). 
Risk communication key factors of success or failure 
For an inclusive and comprehensive risk communication, four key factors have been identified 
in this study; Messages, Channels, Transparency and Trust. These key factors are all affected 
by elements that will be described below, see Figure 3 for an illustration.  
● The conveyed messages should be adapted to a heterogeneous public, flexible in 
literacy and generous in languages.   
● The choice of channels, which is the key to outreach, should be dependent on national 
ICT Access. 
○ Channels and messages should together have a culturally-sensitive/centered 
approach, be adapted to the local context, be aware of the social capital, health 
literacy and how risk perception determines risk preventive behaviors.  
● Transparency from the government, in disclosing all known information. 
○ The information should be accurate and conveyed in a timely manner. 
● Trust is a result from the level of transparency.  
○ The public trust during an outbreak is also a result of governmental actions 
previous to the outbreak. An indirect effect to trust is also the locally adapted 
initiatives and culturally-sensitive/centered approach mentioned above.   
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The extent of consideration regarding these key factors plays a part in determining the level of 
public compliance which can lead to a successful or failing risk communication strategy. The 
outcome of the risk communication could be a crucial factor for mitigating virus transmission.    
  
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this study has been to identify insufficient or inadequate risk communication efforts 
in terms of reaching vulnerable groups among a population during an influenza outbreak. 
Further, to analyze how national influenza preparedness plans and outbreak responses observe 
or ignore these insufficiencies. 
 
The following research questions were asked: 
● What strategies on how to reach vulnerable groups by risk communication are included 
in the national influenza preparedness plans, and ultimately in the national response to 
an influenza outbreak?  
Vietnam show awareness regarding a heterogeneous population in their influenza preparedness 
plan were vulnerable groups, in form of rural populations, low SES and certain occupations are 
addressed. This could include people with low ICT access. It’s further proven by the empirical 
material that locally adapted actions were initiated reaching some vulnerable groups. In the 
light of the ongoing covid-19 pandemic Vietnam widely use the internet as a communication 
channel. Specially designed messages are conducted to reach different groups in the society 
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who hold different needs and demands e.g. sign language videos. Whether vulnerable groups 
in the context of low ICT access are considered is too early to say.  
South Korea has a more homogenous approach and do not specifically address 
vulnerable groups in their influenza preparedness plan. The empirical findings show that low 
SES groups has been more exposed to influenza transmission and also experienced more severe 
infections. Empirical findings have presented targeted text messages and sign language 
interpretation as the only adapted initiatives from the government regarding special 
consideration to vulnerable population groups. South Korea do as well widely use technology 
and the internet when conveying risk messages during the current covid-19 pandemic. 
However, this still does not include the most vulnerable groups who lack ICT access or 
experiences a second-level digital divide.     
Both South Korea and Vietnam showed a broad variety of channels used, where 
targeted text messages particularly could contribute to reaching a substantial part of the 
population, including vulnerable groups. The coverage of mobile subscriptions in both 
countries are large with more than one subscription per person, which likely also include lower 
SES groups. 
 
● Which key factors determine the success or failure of risk communication efforts in 
pandemic influenza preparedness plans? 
Four key factors were identified: Channels, Messages, Transparency and Trust. These key 
factors could be connected as the key to broader compliance among the population which was 
established to be the key to transmission mitigation. This requires that the public is receiving, 
understanding and trusting the information as well as acting on the information. 
 
A general concluding remark is that whether the insufficiencies of risk communication 
strategies in this study were causing outbreaks not to be mitigated is unclear. The task to isolate 
risk communication efforts would not be feasible as too many other factors also play a vital 
role for the pathways and escalation virus of transmission. To pinpoint how insufficiencies 
particularly connected to vulnerable groups are present is not feasible for the same reason. 
However, the results of this study indicate that inequalities exist, and therefore it is also 
reasonable to believe that more efforts that particularly increase possibilities of these groups 
are important and possibly vital for oppressing novel virus outbreaks and mitigating these when 
they occur.  
Discussion 
Ellinas & Lamprianou points out that “The main expectation is that during extraordinary 
economic shocks, the economic and social performance of government has a stronger effect on 
political trust than during normal times.”. A critical situation for a country, as for example an 
influenza epidemic as studied in this thesis, constitutes an opportunity for a government to 
show its capacity to protect its citizens and thereby reinforces structures of trust between the 
government and its population. It's also a time when trust can easily decrease as result of 
unfavorable decisions and actions by the government further reinforcing inequality (Ellinas & 
Lamprianou 2014, p.232). This highlights the importance of this topic as a development issue, 
where the possibility to develop a just, equal and strong society may have its foundation. 
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ICT inclusion strengthens the possibility for individuals to independently access and 
assess information. A multiple set of sources are made available, especially through internet 
access. However, this may also lead to questions on reliability of information and critical 
scrutiny. Rumors may as easily arise as they are responded to, through vast information 
networks that rapidly connects individuals to each other and to institutions. The need for digital 
literacy including a critical eye on information distributed widely through information 
networks is vital (Choi et al. 2012, p.1-4 & 8; Park & Jae Kim 2014, p.77-80). Compliance has 
been argued to be essential in the context of an influenza outbreak in order to mitigate the 
transmission. In relation to enhanced ICT structures that include larger parts of the population, 
compliance should in theory be enhanced (Levi & Stoker 2000, p.492; Kampen, Van De Walle 
& Bouckaert 2006, p.387; Taylor-Clark, Viswanath & Blendon 2010, 226-227). However, the 
independent search of information may also be a driver to critical voices and opposition to 
government strategies which may work in a counterproductive manner. This might also be of 
positive character to oppose unjust or biased decisions. The possibility to such dialogue is 
fundamental to foster a multifaceted debate. Lack of ICT access on the other hand, may foster 
dependency and a “blind” compliance toward governmental restrictions during an outbreak. 
Due to the lack of possibilities to search for other sources of information to widen one’s 
knowledge and thereby question the decisions. Because of rapid action being essential during 
an outbreak and an inclusive discussion may interfere with a timely response. In the best-case 
scenario, guidelines should be presented prior to an outbreak to foster dialogue and be 
responsive to public opinions. This to avoid unnecessary obstacles to an efficient transmission 
mitigation during the outbreak itself, but still reassure responsiveness. In the aim for a better 
compliance, trust and understanding in the event of an outbreak would be an advantageous 
course of action as it would profit to all actors involved (Chuang et al. 2015, p.7; Ulmer, 
Sellnow & Seeger 2011, p.47-48). 
Not to forget that despite a hypothetical universal ICT access, modern technology may 
still not be the most adequate communication channel. As people have different needs and 
demands to receive and process information, communication strategies still need to be 
culturally and locally adapted in order to reach the desired compliance. A trusted community 
leader might be a better and more efficient source for outreach to some audiences. The 
possibility to be exposed by widely disseminated risk communication messages might not fill 
the same function as a trusted source with deep roots in the cultural and emotional realm of an 
individual or a community. 
Suggestions for further research 
We suggest to further research on the impact of ICT, as it opens up a variety of other 
possibilities for development such as transparency and accountability, remote clinical 
assessments, easy collection and storage of data, banking services to rural areas, etc. In 
agreement with Peeri et al. we highly suggest further mapping and researching on this topic to 
find new, innovative and extended ways to make ICT valuable for development causes such as 
IoT (Internet of Things) technologies for mapping the spread of infection (Peeri et al. 2020, 
p.2). In the search for relevant empirical data it was noted that some topics, for example the 
digital divide in Vietnam and identification of vulnerable groups in South Korea, is scarce. 
Further research is needed, particularly with firsthand collected data through field studies. This 
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would better support the understanding of the impact, processes and structures regarding digital 
divide. Mapping of ICT access should especially be conducted in countries with a rapid 
development including a rapid development of communication infrastructures, where the risk 
for a digital divide could be increased (Hammond 1996, p.186). 
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Appendix 1 
South Korea Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan 
2006 
Governance & leadership (trust) 
● Proper charging of information is needed to minimize overblown, unnecessary fear and 
social panic (MOHW & KCDC 2006, p.23). 
● Delayed communication can cause a sector to fall into a state of disorder, possibly 
leading to a society-wide state of lawlessness (ibid, p.23). 
● Each pandemic phase requires a specific communication plan and corresponding action 
guideline for the general public (ibid, p.23). 
● The government must gain the confidence of the general public. Policy-makers, 
spokesperson, and officials in charge must speak and act with consistency in order to 
maintain mutual trust among the three parties (ibid, p.24). 
● During emergency situations, the government must hold pre-scheduled briefings to 
continuously provide up-to-date information (ibid, p.27). 
● Publicize the expert group's opinion, and if possible, include a communications 
specialist in the expert group (ibid, p.28). 
● Strengthen coordination with international organizations and neighboring countries 
(ibid, p.101). 
● Mobilization of the Rapid Response Team - During the pandemic alert period, once a 
sign of a suspect case is detected, immediately dispatch the Team by the order of the 
Director of Korean Centers for Disease Control and prevention (KCDC) (ibid, p.183).  
Communication channels 
● There must also be a plan to develop an IT infrastructure which enables rapid 
dissemination of information (ibid, p.23). 
● Establish a briefing network and schedule - Identify and select media outlets and 
organizations requiring information (ibid, p.27).  
● Appoint a spokesperson to deliver consistent and unified information to the media (ibid, 
p.27). 
● During emergency situations, establish a 24-hour information dissemination scheme 
(ibid, p.28) 
○ Operate hot-lines (ibid, p.28) Continually train call responders to provide 
effective information and counseling services (ibid, p. 90). 
○ Provide the latest information through the internet. (ibid, p.28) Continually 
update contents on websites (ibid, p.90). 
● In order to limit person-to-person contact during a pandemic, utilize various media such 
as the internet, phone, cell phone, printed/broadcast and others will be the primary 
means for risk communication. Therefore, these media channels must be further 
enhanced (ibid, p.28, 85). 
● Educate travelers destined to and arriving from high-risk regions on how to prevent 
infection (p.83) prohibiting or recommending against when applicable (ibid, p.94 & 
104). 
● Hold regular and ad-hoc media briefings on the overseas pandemic (ibid, p.90 & 106). 
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● Post visual notices (poster) regarding influenza at a visible place, such as hospital 
entrances (ibid, p.126). 
● A hospital communication plan has been developed to inform patients and visitors 
about the level of pandemic influenza activity. Collaboration with local healthcare 
facilities should be established for a mutual communication strategy (ibid, p.162). 
Messages 
● Inform public and media on foreign/domestic influenza cases (ibid, p.80, 84 &,100). 
● Educate the public and healthcare workers on various preventive measures against 
infection (ibid, p.105). 
● Conduct public education campaigns and communication for infection prevention (e.g., 
promote hand washing, cough etiquette, etc.) (ibid, p.83). 
● Educate outbound travelers on actions to take when symptoms occur (ibid, p.88). 
● Guidelines for Home Care and Home Nursing of Pandemic Influenza Patients (ibid, 
p.139). 
Communicating uncertainty (transparency) 
● To the extent possible, problems should be announced at its initial stage. - 
Announcements should not be delayed even if the epidemic is small in scale, or if there 
is a lack of information (ibid, p.24). 
● The government has the responsibility to disclose information to the public in a 
transparent manner. There must be a balance between individual civil rights and the 
public's right and need to know for its own benefit.The government must also clarify 
any limitation in the information it provides to the public at the time of disclosure, and 
must inform that new upcoming information could possibly alter the situation (ibid, 
p.24). 
● Continually provide relevant and updated information to the public and media (ibid, 
p.28 & 85). 
● Monitor/disclose information on how the situation is evolving and being managed in 
affected countries and domestically. Share information and make an official 
announcement (ibid, p.90, 101 & 106). 
● Update public messages, such as public action guidelines (ibid, p.90 & 101). 
● Share information on current state and epidemiologic characteristics of domestic 
influenza cases to central & local governments, other related authorities, medical, 
academic or other professional groups/organizations, specialist networks the public and 
media as well as international organizations and neighboring countries (ibid, p.95 & 
106). 
Community engagement (compliance) 
-  
Inequality & access 
● The information should be easy to access, and the format should make the information 
easy to comprehend (ibid, p.28). 
● Inform the human health and veterinary authorities, and local residents of affected area 
on the evolving situation of infection, as well as information on ways to prevent 
infection (ibid, p.85). 
● Strengthen education of the local residents of affected communities on ways to prevent 
and respond to infection (ibid, p.88). 
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● Rapid communications with local governments/authorities of the affected communities 
on the evolving situation and response measures (ibid, p.95). 
● Reinforce public education and outreach programs in affected areas (e.g., promote hand 
washing, cough etiquette, etc.) (ibid, p.99). 
● Rapid Response Team (team on site) shall: 
○ enable collaboration with the local community 
○ hold consultative meetings with relevant agencies and organizations such as 
city/province/ward governments, Office of Education, police stations, fire 
stations, military units, and local medical associations and request for their 
participation and cooperation (ibid, p.185). 
○ Strengthen public outreach programs on infectious disease prevention and 
appropriate community response through local media (e.g., TV or newspapers) 
(ibid, p.185). 
Adaption to a diverse public 
● Have a good understanding of the stakeholders requiring information (e.g., the public, 
members of the press, etc.) and establish a strategy for effective provision and sharing 
of information (ibid, p.24). 
● Involve the stakeholders in the policy decision-making process, and inform the public 
of personal preventive measures (ibid, p.24). 
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Appendix 2 
Risk communication outcomes South Korea - A(H1N1)pdm09 and 
MERS  
Governance & leadership (trust) 
● A cross-sectional study was conducted in three urban and two rural communities, 
randomly selected in South Korea. Among our participants, 37.7% placed the most 
amount of trust in information from health care providers, 29.9% in broadcasters, and 
19.9% in the government, which demonstrates the need for interventions from these 
groups (Kim et al. 2014, p.10 & 18). 
● One of the causes (for failure to prevent deaths during the MERS outbreak) was lack of 
a national system or effective coordination between experts in managing risk 
communication at that time (Kim, Andrew & Jung 2017, p.1). 
● The recurrence (during several epidemics from 2003 and forward) reveals that, despite 
governmental efforts, Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) and risk 
communication strategies have not been sufficiently established or improved in Korea 
(ibid, p. 2). 
● In particular, two key PHEP players, public health authorities and the public, 
demonstrated insufficient preparedness. Reinforcement of and improvements to health 
communication are necessary, such as raising awareness, providing sufficient 
information in a timely manner, and reinforcing public knowledge regarding 
appropriate protective/ preventive behaviors. Finally, greater efforts to build and 
maintain trust for public health authorities and the government is critical, especially in 
situations of uncertainty and high stress (Lee, Ju & You 2019, p. 9). 
● the Korean government responded to the MERS outbreak in an overly optimistic 
manner (Jang et al. 2019, p. 2). 
● Meanwhile, practice rates of reducing transmission behaviors were high in the groups 
that did not support the president. Those who did not stand by the ruling party practiced 
more reducing transmission measures than those who did (ibid, p. 2). 
● the paper underlines the need for systematic risk communication measures, endorsed 
by effective collaboration among political leadership, media and the public (Yang & 
Lee 2020, p.1). 
● The outbreak was entirely nosocomial, and was largely attributable to infection 
management and policy failures, rather than biomedical factors (Kim et al. 2016, 
p.207). 
Communication channels 
● A cross-sectional study was conducted in three urban and two rural communities, 
randomly selected in South Korea. We had similar findings, in that most of our 
participants (88.5%) said that they obtained information from the TV, radio, and 
newspapers (Kim et al. 2014, p.10 & 18). 
● Regarding media use, those that spent more time listening to the radio are 13.9% more 
likely to be vaccinated than those that did not listen to the radio. Those that spent more 
time reading print newspapers are 31.9% more likely to be vaccinated than those that 
do not read print newspapers. However, those that spent more time using the internet 
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are 17.7% less likely to be vaccinated. Those that more actively engaged in health 
information seeking are 22.7% more likely to be vaccinated (Kim & Jung 2017 p. 5-6). 
Messages 
- 
Communicating uncertainty (transparency) 
● MERS prevention measures were not transmitted in a timely manner through official 
channels. Instead, inaccurate health-related information proliferated, leading to disease 
phobia and hysteria among the population (Kim & Jung 2017, p.1). 
● With South Korean government not releasing the hospital information, the nation could 
not obtain geographical information on the viral spread (Lee, Ju & You 2019, p.1). 
● However, some inappropriate actions of the government in the early stages of the 
MERS outbreak contributed to the spread of this epidemic. The government did not 
disclose which hospitals were managing MERS patients in the early stages of the 
outbreak, which not only increased the fear of the public regarding MERS but also 
increased the incidence of secondary infections by super-spreaders—who transmit an 
infection to a significantly greater number of other individuals than average (Jang et al. 
2019, p. 2). 
● Due to increased public anxiety about MERS-CoV, the trust in the Korean government 
had fallen and the image of the Korean president as a leader had been damaged (ibid, 
p. 1-2). 
● There was an alarming level of public fear during the disease outbreak due to an 
information crisis, resulted by the government's hold-back of vital information and the 
widespread MERS rumours on social media (Yang & Lee 2020, p.1). 
● Public agencies had several challenges in seeking risk information to prevent the further 
transmission during the outbreak response. The national public health authority 
disclosed information about hospitals with MERS cases two weeks after the first patient 
was identified and was blamed for the further transmission [61]. Residents who had not 
known about the hospitals and visited the facilities became infected (Kim, Andrew & 
Jung 2017, p.6). 
● It was highlighted that public risk communication was delayed because the South 
Korean Government prioritized the determination of all details of the outbreak rather 
than information disclosure (Kim et al. 2016, p.212). 
● This paper aims to identify the key factors in the amplified spread of MERS-CoV in 
South Korea. The first is the initial failure to confirm diagnosis promptly and to isolate 
the index case after confirmation of MERS in hospital and the lack of detail in tracking 
potential exposures in the community of the index case before isolation. The second is 
the early inadequate measures the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
took in categorizing close contacts. Due to inconsistencies in defining what constitutes 
close contact, a number of cases were neglected from quarantine and were not subjected 
to investigation (Choi et al. 2015 p.487).  
Community engagement (compliance) 
● Individuals show higher behavioral compliance when the perceived effectiveness of 
these measures and H1N1-related anxiety levels are higher (Kim et al. 2014, p.19). 
● Education and information seeking had a direct significant influence on the increased 
practice of hand hygiene (Lee, Ju & You 2019, p.5-6). 
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● Information processing was significantly related to the avoidance behavior. Those who 
felt it was easier to process the health information were more likely to show hospital 
avoidance (ibid, p.6 & 9). 
● The group concerned about MERS infection showed high practice rates of reducing 
transmission behaviors. People in this group were 3 times more likely to wear face 
masks and twice as likely to wash their hands compared with the group that was not 
worried about infection (Jang et al. 2019, p.4). 
● Practice rates of reducing transmission behaviors were high in areas affected by MERS 
and in metropolitan areas (ibid, p.4). 
● The higher the education level, the higher the practice rate was. Housewives and white-
collar workers had high practice rates; while unemployed, blue-collar and self-
employed workers had low practice rates. There was no definitive trend observed with 
respect to perceived household economic status. There were no differences in reducing 
transmission measures between MERS-affected areas and non-affected areas, as well 
as between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. The group that did not indicate 
support for the president and the ruling party had high practice rates of risk avoidance 
behaviors. In addition, perception of MERS led to different risk avoidance behaviors. 
Risk avoidance behaviors were more commonly practiced among those who were 
worried about MERS infection as compared with the non-worried group, worried 
people were also twice as likely to practice all reducing transmission measures. The 
group more likely to predict that MERS would spread also had high rates of risk 
avoidance behaviors (ibid, p.4).  
● groups that were worried about MERS infection were 4.5 times more likely to practice 
reducing transmission behaviors and 9.6 times more likely to practice risk avoidance 
behaviors (ibid, p.7). 
Inequality & access 
● Vaccination compliance was generally low among groups with low socioeconomic 
status (Kim, Andrew & Jung 2017, p.7). 
● Socioeconomic determinants included: Gender, age, education level and income. Age 
and higher education were related to higher frequency of information seeking during 
the MERS outbreak (Lee, Ju & You 2019, p.6). 
● Socioeconomic determinants included: Gender, age, education level and income. Only 
higher income was related to higher level of information processing (ibid, p.6). 
● We found that individual economic status influenced infection severity (Choi et al. 
2012, p.5).  
● National Health Insurance, NHI (96,3% of the total Korean population, p.2) 
beneficiaries were less likely to experience severe illness than patients in the Medical 
Aid program (low income group, p.2) (ICU; OR, 0.460; 95% CI, 0.387–0.548) (ibid, 
p.5). 
● One social issue in Korea is that the average age of the population in rural areas is 
increasing; thus, it is assumed that age specific immunity and mortality were the cause 
of the observed variations in incidence in the regions, together with differences in the 
transmission potential according to population density (ibid, p.8). 
● After classifying the region by city and province, the incidence of influenza A (H1N1) 
was higher in provinces where the proportions of 0–19 yr patients (24.30%) and those 
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>60 yr (15.99% ) were greater than those in the city (22.73% and 13.57% respectively) 
(ibid, p.8). 
● After classifying the region into two groups such as city and province, the incidence of 
influenza A (H1N1) and the risk of severe outcomes were higher in provinces.The 
proportion of working people aged in their 20 s to 50 s among residents, the lower risk 
groups for influenza A (H1N1), was greater in the city (ibid, p.8). 
● Accessibility to medical treatment and hygiene could differ according to individual 
economic conditions. This may have caused a delay in seeking medical care after 
symptom onset. The length of time from symptom onset to treatment is associated with 
illness severity (ibid, p.8). 
● Severe pandemic H1N1 influenza was associated with [...] lower economic status (ibid, 
p.1). 
● The number of patients exposed to novel influenza A (H1N1) was highest in and around 
the capital area, but the incidence per 100 people was also high in Gwangju (6.67) and 
Chungbuk (6.38) (both provinces). The highest incidence rate of severe outcomes was 
in Gangwon (4.89 ICU (intensive care unit) admissions/100,000), where most of the 
districts are rural areas. (ibid, p.4). 
● Our results indicate that education is negatively related to exposure to entertainment 
media. The lower the education level, the more likely people are exposed to 
entertainment media (Oh, Paek & Hove 2015, p.26). 
● This result implies that people with disabilities have lower ICT usage capacity than 
people without disabilities because disabled people cannot develop their ICT usage 
capacity without auxiliary facilities (Doh & Stough 2010, p.66). 
Adaption to a diverse public 
● Moreover, additional support for vulnerable populations should be made by providing 
free and easy access to targeted, tailored messages with the appropriate literacy to 
enhance health communication ability (Lee, Ju & You 2019, p. 9). 
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Appendix 3 
Risk communication outcomes South Korea - Covid-19 
Governance & leadership (trust) 
● Applying lessons learned from the MERS outbreak in 2015, Korea has been 
strengthening its infectious disease surveillance and response capacity. [...] The Korea 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) has also been upgraded [...] 
Specialized divisions have been established for risk assessment, emergency operations, 
crisis communication, and partner coordination (Chung & Soh 2020). 
● Dalia Research survey of 45 countries: Government's Covid-19 response is rated by 
800 Korean people as: “Far too little”: 12%, “A bit too little”: 20%, “Right amount”: 
45% “A bit too much”: 6%, “Far too much”:7%, “don't know”: 13% (Dalia Research 
2020). 
    
Communication channels 
● Hidden hero of COVID-19 pandemic: Life of a sign language interpreter [YouTube] 
(Arirang News 2020). 
● For the past month, South Korean residents have been receiving flurries of emergency 
text messages from authorities, alerting them to the movements of local people with 
COVID-19 (Zastrow 2020). 
● When I returned from Germany at the end of March, there was a well-functioning 
protocol in place. Before I left Frankfurt Airport, I was asked to download an app from 
the Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare, and a second, from the Ministry of Interior 
and Safety, once I landed (Klingebiel 2020). 
● We all knew very clearly, thanks to the daily government news briefings, emergency 
alerts, web and mobile-based apps, and GPS trackers, what symptoms to be wary of, 
etc. [...] (ibid). 
● Transparency and communication have helped allay fear and prevent panic. The 
government rolled out a massive public information campaign on personal hygiene and 
social distancing. It has conducted twice-daily press briefings, updated its online 
information continuously, and sent out targeted text messages (Chung & Soh 2020). 
● Korea has also encouraged public-private partnerships to leverage technology for better 
health outcomes. For example, KT, a major Korean ICT company, has developed its 
Global Epidemic Prevention Platform (GEPP), an infectious disease prevention 
platform that it is piloting in Ghana and Kenya, with plans for expansion in East Asia. 
A smartphone app alerts mobile phone users of nearby outbreaks and lets them 
communicate their health conditions to authorities (ibid). 
Messages 
● When a person tests positive, their city or district might send out an alert to people 
living nearby about their movements before being diagnosed. A typical alert can contain 
the infected person’s age and gender, and a detailed log of their movements down to 
the minute  — in some cases traced using closed-circuit television and credit-card 
transactions, with the time and names of businesses they visited. In some districts, 
public information includes which rooms of a building the person was in, when they 
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visited a toilet and whether or not they wore a mask. Even overnight stays at ‘love 
motels’ have been noted (Zastrow 2020). 
● Campaigns encouraging people to avoid large gatherings — have helped to reduce the 
virus’s spread (ibid).  
● We all knew very clearly, [...] what symptoms to be wary of, what to do and where to 
go for testing, which neighbourhood pharmacy carried masks that day, and which 
“infection locations” to avoid visiting (Klingebiel 2020). 
Communicating uncertainty (transparency)  
● The South Korean government says the public is more likely to trust it if it releases 
transparent and accurate information about the virus, including travel histories of 
confirmed patients. Laws passed since the country's last major disease outbreak, of 
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) in 2015, now specifically allow authorities 
to publish this information (Zastrow 2020). 
● South Korea’s data transparency during this outbreak has its origins in how the 
government handled the 2015 outbreak of MERS, which reportedly infected 186 people 
in South Korea and killed 36. The government at the time initially refused to identify 
the hospitals in which infected people were being treated, but a software programmer 
made a map of cases based on crowdsourced reports and anonymous tips from hospital 
staff. Eventually, the government relented and named the affected hospitals (ibid). 
● This inundation of real-time public information is what has really helped South Korea 
throughout this crisis (Klingebiel 2020). 
● Korea is managing the COVID-19 crisis by emphasizing transparency and open 
communication, public-private partnerships, evidence-based deployment of public 
health measures, and innovative use of technology and data (Chung & Soh 2020). 
● Transparency and communication have helped allay fear and prevent panic. [...] 
Combined with a massive rollout of testing and information on the results, fear and 
misinformation have been minimized (ibid 2020). 
Community engagement (compliance) 
● [...] many people are self-disciplined, staying at home, even if this is based on a 
voluntary basis and wearing masks all the time (Klingebiel 2020). 
● Experience with the MERS may also have made Koreans better prepared to follow 
public health communication on COVID-19 (Chung & Soh 2020). 
Inequality & access  
- 
Adaption to a diverse public  
- 
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Appendix 4 
The Vietnam Integrated National Operational Program on Avian 
Influenza, Pandemic Preparedness and Emerging Infectious Diseases 
(AIPED) 2011-2015 
Governance & leadership (trust) 
● [Progress has been made considering] promotion of public awareness and behavioural 
change (MARD & MOH 2011, vii). 
● Communications, public awareness and behavioural change will continue to evolve 
from a primary focus on public awareness raising to implementing behaviour change 
communications and assessing which approaches and models are most successful in 
Vietnam. The AHI Behaviour Change Working Group will review the existing strategic 
framework for AHI communications and develop a new detailed communications 
strategy in support of the plan for 2011-2015 (ibid, viii). 
● National preparedness for a new strain of influenza or another novel infectious disease 
is an important national task that covers both the health sector and other sectors, taking 
into account potential impacts on both human health as well as many other important 
aspects including ensuring the continuity of essential services and infrastructure, 
effective public communications, etc. (ibid, xi). 
● Achieved 2006-2010: Communications plans to inform the general public and health 
personnel of requirements during different pandemic phases have been established 
(ibid, p.7). 
● Both internal and external (international) reporting are contingent on the timely flow of 
information from localities to central level (ibid p.78). 
● Lessons learned 2006-2010: Effective collaborations - which may consist of formal 
linkages with other national coordination and regulatory authorities - need to also be 
expanded to include other relevant sectors such as environment, wildlife, and essential 
services (energy, telecommunications, finance and banking, law and public security, 
public utilities, transportation). This is important for a truly transdisciplinary approach 
to preventing and managing communicable diseases, and for the development of 
comprehensive emergency response plans for pandemics (and other hazards)(ibid, 
p.79). Relevant public sectors would include: [...] Ministry of Information and 
Communication [...] (ibid, p.79). 
● Lessons learned 2006-2010: There remains a large volume of information to be 
validated, synthesized and translated into policies and programs - [...] communications 
and social marketing (ibid, p.83). 
● Lessons learned 2006-2010: Flexibility has also been important in the national response 
to influenza A/H1N1 - responses must be adapted to the evolution of the local epidemic 
in a timely fashion. This includes consideration of the severity of the disease and the 
impact of public health actions (ibid, p.83). 
● The national Avian Influenza and emerging diseases plan must be clearly and carefully 
communicated to all stakeholders so that all parties are fully committed to its 
coordinated implementation. As discussed in the section on coordination, this means 
sound communications within the health sector, as well as reliable information 
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exchanges to the party level, other government agencies, civil society organisations, 
private businesses and the media (ibid, p.85). 
● The mobilization and participation of the whole of government, social and civil society 
organizations, the mass media and the whole of society at all levels with technical 
guidance of the agriculture and health sectors was a key factor in the success of public 
awareness-raising and communication activities particularly during high-risk periods 
(ibid, p.85). 
● Communication with the public is a key prevention and control strategy for all emerging 
diseases (ibid, p.10). 
● Consideration of how the prevention and control of high-risk emerging infectious 
diseases can effectively be ‘socialized’ through the involvement of a wide set of 
stakeholders at different levels, including mass organizations, commercial and 
professional associations, and social and civil groups (ibid, p.23). 
● Livestock management: Experiences with Avian Influenza over the last five years have 
demonstrated the importance of involving communication experts, technical experts 
and end users in the design and implementation of behavioural change and 
communication campaigns (ibid, p.45). 
● The wide variety of private professionals practicing in Vietnam can add value across 
the range of pandemic responses including surveillance, implementing infection control 
measures, supporting government directives such as social distancing measures and risk 
communications, and providing curative and supportive (e.g. psychological) services 
(ibid, p.57). 
● IHR (2005) Indicator 6: Are public health emergency response mechanisms 
established? 
○ Detailed plans are limited to the health sector although the pandemic action plan 
does outline communications, roles and responsibilities of other key 
coordinating ministries, unions and the Vietnam Red Cross (ibid, p.144). 
● IHR (2005) Indicator 10: Are mechanisms for effective risk communication during a 
public health emergency established?  
○ Partly. Need evaluation and further development (ibid, p.144). 
Communication channels 
● Risk communication messages from government to the public during outbreaks can be 
partly designed and tested in advance to ensure rapid implementation when required. 
This includes print, electronic and media materials, as well as fostering relationships 
with key disseminators of information such as the media (ibid, p.85). 
● Novel models of communication such as use of mobile phones (SMS) will be 
considered for selected subpopulations as part of behavioural change projects and for 
risk communications during outbreaks (ibid, p.60). 
● Health managers from the central to local level require further training to improve risk 
communications during public health emergencies (ibid, p.60).  
● Improving the knowledge and communication skills of health workers in hospitals and 
preventive health units (63 provinces x $10,000/ 5 years) (ibid, p.125). 
● Conducting community Avian Influenza communication campaigns (63 provinces x 
$20,000/year x 2 turns/ 5 years). IEC (Information, Education & Communication) 
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printing and distribution (630,000 materials/turn x $30,000/turn x 10 turns) (ibid, 
p.125). 
● Annual publicity campaigns during high risk periods and in areas where vaccination 
campaigns are being modified (ibid, p.135). 
● Review of BCC (behavioural change communication) campaigns and programs 
including school based programs to determine which methods warrant replication (ibid, 
p.135). 
● Improve communication activities through central and local agricultural extension 
system (ibid, p.135). 
Messages 
● Some specific opportunities for mainstreaming and integration of behaviour change 
communications in the coming period include food safety and hygiene promotion 
activities such as the Vietnam Handwashing Initiative and food safety communication 
initiatives of MOH and the Livestock Competitiveness and Food Safety Project 
(LIFSAP) of MARD (ibid, p.23). 
● Livestock management: Communications on ongoing and seasonal risks of outbreaks 
of HPAI. These communications could also be extended to other diseases in livestock 
and wildlife depending on the actual situation and risk analysis (ibid, p.45). 
● Communications on the dangers of handling, butchering, preparing and consuming sick 
or dead poultry, and the need to report diseases in poultry and other livestock on wildlife 
(ibid, p.45). 
● Livestock management: Annual publicity campaigns during high risk periods and in 
areas where vaccination campaigns are being modified (ibid, p.46). 
● Consideration should be given to the need for communications to both agriculture 
sector and health sector officials and workers and the general public on the ongoing 
risks of disease transmission within and between different livestock and wildlife species 
and humans and behaviours that can reduce these risks, applying a One Health approach 
(ibid, p.60). 
● Challenges: Lessons should not be limited to responding to influenza and emerging 
communicable diseases, but should be considered for a wide range of health 
communications. Similarly, opportunities should be looked for to integrate health 
messages relevant to influenza in non-influenza activities (ibid, p.61).  
● Development of appropriate communication package to discourage butchering of dead 
or sick poultry (ibid, p.135). 
Communicating uncertainty (transparency) 
● Lessons learned 2006-2010: Vietnam has worked closely with WHO, OIE and other 
partners to ensure transparency and to fulfil its obligations under international 
agreements (ibid, p.78). 
● Timely communication of accurate information to the public, the media, health 
workers, and decision makers within health and other government ministries is a core 
operational objective. This applies for health emergency communications during a 
pandemic or the emergence of a new infectious disease, behaviour change 
communications that are of particular relevance in addressing HPAI and other diseases 
in animals, including wildlife, and their risk to humans, and operations communications 
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to ensure the smooth working of multiple organisations in responding to threats (ibid, 
p. 21). 
● Continuing to strengthen coordination with media to maintain reliable mechanisms and 
capacity for timely, accurate dissemination of information to the general public (ibid, 
p.23). 
Community engagement (compliance) 
● Rumour surveillance is also of importance in areas considered at high risk for emerging 
diseases. Engaging the general public, community leaders, workers from key 
occupations and the local media can expedite reporting of unusual occurrences in 
strategic locations (ibid, p.51). 
● Social supports that enable people to comply with public health interventions such as 
home isolation will need to be identified and included within local pandemic plans. The 
success of such measures is intimately linked to how well government communicates 
these measures and ultimately how compliant people are (ibid, p.57).  
Inequality & access 
● A number of human cases of influenza A(H5N1) in Vietnam and elsewhere still appear 
to result from handling and consuming of sick and dead poultry. Therefore the public 
health messages related to these practices need to be refined. Communication programs 
must acknowledge that poverty is one of the drivers of these practices and be aligned 
with activities designed to reduce poverty (ibid, p.85). 
● Facilitating rapid investigation and containment activities through the development of 
rapid response teams. New standard short course epidemiological training Package that 
include follow up monitoring and support have been developed by the NIHE (National 
Institute for Hygiene and Epidemiology) for provincial and district preventive health 
staff to bolster their ability to analyse data, conduct outbreak investigations and institute 
control measures (ibid, p.52). 
● Training needs to be scaled up so that all local public health workers are equipped with 
basic epidemiological, information technology, communications, and management and 
leadership skills (ibid, p.52). 
● The preventive health system down to the local level is a key element for the delivery 
of health sector messages to the general public and key target groups. The availability 
of sufficient human resources is still constrained, particularly in poor and isolated areas 
within the country (ibid, p.60). 
● Challenges: Socioeconomic analyses should pay particular attention to gender-related 
dimensions, taking into account differences in the roles of women and men in livelihood 
activities, decision making, caregiving, access to information and economic resources, 
participation in local networks, exposure to risk and other related aspects (ibid, p.61). 
● Maintaining internet network for regional, provincial, district levels (750 units x 
$2,000). Providing computers and maintaining the internet network for surveillance at 
commune level 11,000 communes x $1,000/set 11,000 communes x $200 to maintain 
internet network (ibid, p.137). 
Adaption to a diverse public 
● For instance, public perception of social distancing measures and views on risk 
messages are important to refine pandemic communications (ibid, p.23). 
  
72 Appendix 4 
● Achieved 2006-2010: Behaviour change communications programs targeted at people 
involved in poultry production have been conducted (ibid, p.7). 
● This notion of an active learning system should be extended beyond the health sector 
to include all stakeholders listed in the national action plan for pandemic influenza such 
as other Ministries, the Vietnam Red Cross and various unions (ibid, p.83). 
● Lessons learn 2006-2010: Communication with the public is a key prevention and 
control strategy for all emerging diseases. Communication strategies need to move 
beyond provision of information and awareness-raising for the general public to more 
targeted, proven measures for behaviour change based on an understanding of what 
works locally (ibid, p.85).  
● Knowledge of disease can be improved through IEC (Information, Education & 
Communication) campaigns but behavioural change is more difficult to achieve 
especially if the public sees little reason or incentive to change long-standing 
behaviours and practices. BCC (Behavioural change communication) activities need to 
be based on sound analysis of local perceptions and rational expectations around drivers 
and incentives for proposed changes in behaviours. Campaigns must also be of 
sufficient duration to ensure lasting behavioural changes (ibid, p.85). 
● During the previous five-year period, the response to avian and pandemic influenza has 
moved from a primary focus on public awareness raising to implementing behaviour 
change communications and assessing which approaches and models are most 
successful in Vietnam (ibid, p.21). 
● The National Strategic Framework for Avian and Human Influenza Communications 
(document not publicly available) analyzes communication priorities for key target 
groups in the agriculture and health sectors in terms of technical validity and practical 
feasibility for adoption (ibid, p.21). 
● Detailed plan for behavioural changes promoted for key target groups before and during 
an outbreak (ibid, p.21). 
● The current context of low risk perception and competition of other important issues 
amongst key target groups including authorities at different levels, health care workers, 
poultry sector workers, the media and the general public and the need to identify an 
effective rationale and incentives for target groups to change their behaviours (ibid, 
p.22).  
● The availability of tested models and approaches for different types of communications 
at the community level (ibid, p.23). 
● The results of detailed reviews and evaluations of the effectiveness of different types 
of communication activities, including identifying strengths and weaknesses, overall 
progress and remaining tasks, as well as detailed reviews carried out at the local level 
in order to build a ‘bottom-up’ planning approach (ibid, p.23). 
● The need to ensure that public health communications, agricultural extension and other 
supportive communications are planned, resourced and carried out in step with changes 
in the agricultural sector’s control plans, particularly for changes to poultry vaccination 
that may alter the risk to human populations and that require the awareness and 
cooperation of different groups within the population (ibid, p.23). 
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● Livestock management: Particular attention to communications on the dangers of 
handling of sick or dead animals in remote and poor areas is required based on lessons 
learned in the previous period (ibid, p.45). 
● Livestock management: A range of communication approaches should be considered, 
depending on the specific contents and targeted populations (ibid, p.46). 
● Regular (annual or biennial) reviews of the national action plan are required to adapt to 
shifting local circumstances (ibid, p.49). 
● It is particularly important to develop coordinated multi-sectoral action at provincial 
levels given the ongoing decentralisation process, rather than just a series of parallel 
vertical plans. Ultimately, however, these planning efforts require direction and 
coordination from national leaders. Adequate budgets are required to develop and 
maintain operational pandemic plans. These plans must reflect realities with regard to 
human resources and relevance to provincial priorities (ibid, p.57). 
● During the initial period of the new plan, the health sector will review the behavioural 
change communications work undertaken during 2006-2010 for HPAI to determine 
what worked, where, when and why. In addition to assessing the messages delivered 
and the mode of delivery, this review will also to look at structural and environmental 
aspects that positively or negatively influenced behaviour change (ibid, p.59). 
● Challenges: The strategy for communications in the health sector needs to be prepared 
with recognition of the current context of low-risk perception amongst different key 
target groups. Behaviour change communications need to be based on a clear rationale 
and incentives for target populations to change their behaviours and should identify and 
address factors that inhibit or encourage populations to change their behaviours (ibid, 
p.60).  
● Challenges: The current low risk perception of the public and key target groups is a key 
challenge for communication efforts. The impact of public awareness and behaviour 
change campaigns need to be evaluated (ibid, p.61).  
● Development of appropriate extension and training Package for slaughterhouse and 
market workers on disease control and prevention and hygiene measures (ibid, p.135). 
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Appendix 5 
Risk communication outcomes Vietnam - Avian Influenza (H5N1) and 
A(H1N1)pdm09 
Governance & leadership (trust) 
● Implemented measures when cases were identified in the Asian region: 
○ Communications with any MBDS (Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance) 
country 
○ Communications with MBDS Coordinator 
○ Communications with any external partner (Moore & Dausey 2011, p.5). 
● The experience of three programmes in the Mekong Region that used BCC to prevent 
and control outbreaks of Avian Influenza bore out this finding. These programmes 
worked with the Vietnam Women’s Union to mobilize local women as conduits for 
education (Waisbord, Michaelides & Rasmuson 2008, p.197). 
● A key component of the discussions was to encourage women farmers to express 
anxieties about, and obstacles to, biosecurity-related changes. These discussions gave 
the trained VWU staff, and others, an opportunity to problem solve collectively, and 
made the desired changes more attainable (ibid, p.203-204). 
● Local organizations’ social standing makes them trusted sources of information (ibid, 
p.209). 
● Tapping into the social capital of rural communities can promote participatory 
communication and local ownership. Associations are not simply dissemination 
conduits for print materials. Involving communities through local institutions activates 
institutional and informal networks of interpersonal communication, and ensures that 
populations lead the communicative process. (ibid, p.210). 
● We intended to build on the activities of existing local associations that were trusted 
and had legitimacy, thereby tapping into existing communication capital, rather than 
forging new associations with questionable continuity and community trust (ibid, 
p.210). 
● In Vietnam, many government and non-governmental organizations have been 
involved in HPAI public awareness and behavioural change and communication since 
the first HPAI outbreaks occurred in late 2003. However, although some degree of 
collaboration exists, there is not yet a formal coordination and communication 
mechanism between ministries or among various agencies. This has led to some 
overlaps and a waste of resources, as well as confusion among the audience receiving 
inconsistent messages, unnecessary competition for the audience’s time and attention, 
and the potential for low-impact results due to technically incorrect information (Hai 
2009, p.55-56). 
● In addition, monitoring and evaluation of activities and behavioural surveillance need 
to be improved, and the capacity of government agencies [...] needs to be further 
strengthened (ibid, p.56).  
● The recently passed Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases has clear 
stipulations on information, education and communication regarding the prevention and 
control of pandemics, as well as the responsibilities of the Ministries of Health, 
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Information and Communication, Education and Training, Labour, Invalid and Social 
Affairs, the local authorities and mass media (ibid, p.56). 
Communication channels 
● This cadre (Vietnam Women's Union) was entrusted with imparting reliable 
information against a backdrop of conflicting national, regional, and global media 
reports, on a rapidly-evolving avian influenza outbreak situation. They were used to 
disseminate information quickly when new outbreaks were reported, as well as to 
reinforce information between outbreaks (Waisbord, Michaelides & Rasmuson 2008, 
p.203). 
● The workshops (conducted by Vietnam's Women’s Union) featured sessions on poultry 
health, human health, communication skills, and group discussion facilitation skills 
(ibid, p.203). 
● The district women’s unions were also responsible for distributing information, 
education, and communication (IEC) materials, including leaflets and posters on Avian 
Influenza prevention and control (ibid, p.203). 
● Some provinces plan to collaborate with local government culture and information 
units, to disseminate AI messages through local radio stations and commune 
loudspeakers, and others plan to identify model farms that practice positive biosecurity 
behaviours (ibid, p.204). 
● 87.5% have received the pandemic information through flyers, radio, TV spots, 
newspaper, and meetings (Ngan et al. 2011, p.1). 
● The capacity of [...] the mass media needs to be further strengthened (Hai 2009, p.56). 
● A nation-wide IEC campaign focused on key messages to prevent transmission from 
poultry to humans, using the mass media, civil society organizations, and 
communication officers and health facilities as the main communication vehicles (ibid, 
p.56). 
● In Vietnam, thanks to effective public administration, the mass media can be easily 
mobilized for the dissemination and broadcasting of information related to diseases and 
pandemics (ibid, p.56).  
Messages 
● There were active public health education efforts in all countries. In the countries with 
AHI cases, most of the messages and materials were related to the handling of livestock 
and basic health hygiene such as hand washing, protection when sneezing/coughing. 
The main strategy of public health education was to focus on the prevention of Avian 
Influenza transmission (e.g. use chicken as a mascot, etc). Very few messages were on 
pandemic influenza (Hanvoravongchai et al. 2010, p.7). 
● Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Ministry of Health and the 
Ministry of Culture and Information will work within the National Steering Committee 
to coordinate IEC strategies, messages, [...] (Hai 2009, p.56). 
● The IEC materials included a leaflet called ‘Preventing Bird Flu in Poultry and 
Humans’, developed by AED, a poster on the importance of fencing poultry, and 
another poster on quarantining new poultry for 2 weeks. AED also developed an avian 
influenza booklet for communicators that was distributed to VWU staff in 24 provinces. 
An estimated 8,300 fencing posters, 8,300 poultry separation posters, and 1.9 million 
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bird flu prevention leaflets were disseminated through the VWU members (Waisbord, 
Michaelides & Rasmuson 2008, p.203). 
Communicating uncertainty (transparency) 
● Implemented measures when cases were identified in Vietnam:  
○ Public risk communications - everywhere 
○ Consistency in messages for the public 
○ Messages aimed to avoid public panic 
○ Spokesperson identified (Moore & Dausey 2011, p.5). 
● 83.9% of respondents felt that the pandemic responses by the government were 
essential and timely (Ngan et al. 2011, p.1). 
● MARD, the MOH and the Ministry of Culture and Information will work within the 
National Steering Committee to coordinate IEC strategies, [...] timing of campaigns 
(Hai 2009, p.56). 
Community engagement (compliance) 
● Local women’s unions in Vietnam, could tailor information to be more palatable and 
reflective of their neighbours’ realities and, thus, more likely to be followed. They could 
discuss these realities with their communities on a case-by-case basis, and help them 
devise solutions to reduce their risk of avian influenza infection, while reflecting the 
limitations of their situation (Waisbord, Michaelides & Rasmuson 2008, p.209). 
● Of the 280 women who attended the discussion in the town of Kim Bai, an estimated 
150 immediately began to adapt measures to prevent AI in their poultry (ibid, p.209). 
● For example, in a group discussion held by the Kim Bai Town Women’s Union in Ha 
Tay Province, many farmers expressed concern about separating their backyard 
chickens and ducks because they did not have enough space in their small yards. 
Through discussion, they determined that it would be easier to raise one or two kinds 
of poultry rather than many different types that would have to be kept separate. Other 
alternatives were using lime powder if they could not afford chemical disinfectants, and 
using plastic bags to touch sick or dead poultry if they did not have protective gloves 
(ibid, p.203-204). 
● A cross sectional survey was conducted in Cu Chi district of Ho Chi Minh City and 
Ninh Kieu district of Can Tho City. Among 304 individuals (32% male and 68% 
female) who were selected systematic randomly and representing for risk population as 
workers, students who living in the boarding houses, boarding schools. Respondents 
rated face-mask and hand-washing as the most effective preventive measures (97%). 
The percentage of people who have good knowledge on pandemic influenza personal 
prevention (i.e. wash hands plus avoid close contact with sick people) was 74.7%, while 
only 36.8% had good knowledge on community prevention (cover nose and mouth 
when coughing or sneezing, stay home from work or school if sick, cleaning house) 
(Ngan et al. 2011, p.1). 
● Implementing education programs were successful and effective in raising public 
awareness about influenza pandemic. This proven that education measurement is one 
of important keys of pandemic containment strategies. Although the percentage of 
people having good knowledge and acceptable attitude were high, practice on 
community prevention among local people was still poor. Therefore, in the future 
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education programs should focus on improving good practice for containing 
community transmission of influenza pandemic (ibid, p.1).  
Inequality & access 
● The Vietnam Women’s Union (VWU) [...] With 11 million members, this national 
organization can reach every community in the country through village-level 
representation. Although controlled by the Communist Party of Vietnam, and 
historically used by the Government of Vietnam as a key avenue of communication to 
women, the VWU has a broad agenda to promote women’s rights and well-being, and 
has worked successfully with many international NGOs. A civil society organization 
within the socialist model, it was created by the state, but its grassroots members are 
mobilized for development activities in the same way as civic groups in non-communist 
states (Waisbord, Michaelides & Rasmuson 2008, p.199). 
● The first two planning workshops, in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, in April 2006, were 
attended by VWU representatives from all 64 provinces. This was followed by training 
of trainers (ToT) workshops for VWU officers in 24 provinces, who, in turn, trained 
over 3,840 district and commune women’s union officers (ibid, p.202-203). 
● the trained women would be responsible for conveying key messages in their villages.1 
(ibid, p.203). 
● This is further illustrated by the fact that many services and related information are not 
made available in the local language (Målqvist et al. 2013, p.16). 
● Article 7 of the Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases stipulates that 
the Father Front of Vietnam—an umbrella organization which has a strong base in all 
localities of the country with mass participation and popular mobilization—is 
responsible for informing and persuading the people to prevent and control infectious 
diseases, and for supervising implementation of the law (Hai 2009, p.56). 
Adaption to a diverse public 
● Implemented measures when cases were identified in Vietnam:  
○ Public risk communications - targeted (Moore & Dausey 2011, p.5). 
● The relative weakness of large-scale media in rural areas in the Mekong Delta region 
required a different approach to reach populations in a short time: tapping into existing 
public assets to articulate and mobilize complex information (Waisbord, Michaelides 
& Rasmuson 2008, p.199). 
● Local ownership ensures the cultural relevance and appropriateness of activities and 
messages (ibid, p.210). 
● The challenge for health ministries relates both to strategy and instrumentation. 
Ministries must adjust their strategies and interventions to avoid the twin dangers of 
bureaucratic standardization (resulting in reduced relevance in local conditions) and 
micromanagement (which is neither effective nor feasible) (Fritzen 2007, p.75). 
● MARD, the MOH and the Ministry of Culture and Information will work within the 
National Steering Committee to coordinate IEC strategies, [...], target audiences [...] 
(Hai 2009, p.56). 
● Recent events around the fight against pandemic influenza have shown that the mass 
media plays a vital role in influencing behavioural changes that may be necessary in 
order to curb a pandemic in urban areas. In the rural areas, where mass media was less 
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able to be utilized, the local authorities, health care institutions, educational institutions, 
military units and Father Front of Vietnam and its affiliates can be effective (ibid, p.56). 
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Appendix 6 
Risk communication outcomes - Covid-19 
Governance & leadership (trust) 
● In a Dalia Research survey of 45 countries asking about public opinion of government 
responses to the pandemic, 62 percent of Vietnamese participants said that the 
government is doing the “right amount,” topping the survey’s average with a higher 
rate than other “model” countries such as Singapore and South Korea (Vu & Tran 
2020).  
● Dalia Research survey of 45 countries: Government's Covid-19 response is rated by 
800 Vietnamese people as: “Far too little”: 5%, “A bit too little”: 8%, “Right amount”: 
62% “A bit too much”: 7%, “Far too much”:5%, “Don't know”: 13% (Dalia Research 
2020).  
● On March 10, the Ministry of Health launched the health declaration mobile application 
NCOVI to help the public report their medical conditions and follow the contact tracing 
operation, just before the WHO declared a global pandemic on March 11 (Vu & Tran 
2020). 
● [Prime Minister] Phúc has met with strong approval from the Vietnamese public. 
Vietnam’s people appear to be among the most confident globally in how their 
government has handled the pandemic (Phuong Nguyen 2020).  
● In the later periods, the emergence of strong political leaders such as Deputy Prime 
Minister Vu Duc Dam had a significant and positive influence on public perception of 
the Vietnamese government as well as the consensus and trust in Vietnam’s efforts to 
fight against the pandemic (Le et al. 2020, p. 17). 
● For example, the government has pooled all available resources and expertise from 
hospitals across Vietnam to carry out life-saving measures for the three most serious 
cases of COVID-19 patients (Phuong Nguyen 2020).  
Communication channels  
● On February 9, the Ministry of Health held a teleconference with the WHO and 700 
hospitals at all levels nationwide to disseminate information on nCoV prevention and 
launched a website to disseminate information to the wider public (Vu & Tran 2020). 
● The Ministry of Health took the initiative to launch a website and a mobile application 
not only to ease the medical process but also to disseminate accurate information 
quickly. The digital apparatus helped stem the spread of rumors and fake news, in 
addition to legal enforcement against people who spread inaccurate information or 
engage in profiteering. State media have also constantly covered the hotspots of the 
pandemic like China, Italy, Spain, and the United States to raise public awareness about 
the seriousness of COVID-19 and to demonstrate the essential of robust government 
intervention (ibid). 
● Since late January, the government has required all people arriving from China to 
submit a health declaration and undertake quarantine in government-controlled 
facilities for 14 days. These requirements were gradually expanded to those arriving 
from the Republic of Korea, the United States, and EU countries. Quarantine is largely 
in military facilities and is free of charge (WHO, 2020b). 
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● Localized centers for disease control and preventive health facilities are closely 
collaborating with hospitals in case detection, isolation and treatment (Le, 2020). 
● The public is well-informed of personal protective measures. The Ministry of Health 
informs the public of positive cases and potential exposures, and has provided 
guidelines for disease prevention on its websites. A government-run media campaign, 
including a viral music video, has promoted personal protective behaviors, while public 
and private telecom companies have collectively sent 3 billion messages on COVID-
19 prevention to mobile phone users (ibid). 
● Regular SMS messages sent to all phones from the very early stages told people what 
they could do to protect themselves (Jones 2020). 
● [...] live chat for questions related to COVID-19 (La et al. 2020, p. 9). 
● Hanoi Smart City app was also activated to provide a risk assessment tool, consultation 
on prevention measurements, contact reports and live updates for Hanoi citizens (ibid, 
p.12).  
● These social media channels (Facebook and Zalo) provide additional room for the 
government, particularly the Ministry of Health, to communicate coronavirus-related 
information to its citizens in a timely manner (ibid, p.13).  
● Long and short versions of Vietnamese sign language stop-motion videos on the do's 
and don'ts for children produced and distributed over 30 online media, through UNICEF 
and official Government social media channels (Flowers 2020). 
● More than 30 online assets including videos, images with prevention and public health 
messages, and infographics widely disseminated through online and social media 
channels, including mummy bloggers and Kidsonline (a cloud-based Nursery and 
Kindergarten management system in Viet Nam) (ibid). 
● Launched a national TikTok site Happyathome (challenge #ONhaVanVui) with more 
than 380 million views, 38,471 videos and 35 million likes (ibid). 
● Produced a handwashing dance video with a Vietnamese celebrity dancer and kids and 
disseminated on social media (ibid). 
● UNICEF posts on social media (Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, etc.) related on 
COVID19 have more than 2 million reaches (ibid). 
● Dissemination of communication materials relating to COVID-19 through private 
sector networks – Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), International 
Business associations, business consultancies, companies (employing white-collar and 
blue-collar employees) (ibid). 
● Development of a 2-pager on family-friendly workplace in the context of COVID-19 
(adapted from the regional guidance) which was disseminated through private sector 
networks (ibid). 
● First episodes of “At home during pandemic” were on air from April 1 with UNICEF’s 
expert blog. The development of the expert blog is ongoing (ibid). 
Messages 
● Since “day one,” the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the state have led the 
fight with the motto “fighting the epidemic is like fighting against the enemy.” (Vu & 
Tran 2020).  
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● Vietnam made use of its ever-present propaganda machine to run a vigorous awareness 
campaign, drawing on wartime imagery and rhetoric to unite the public in the fight 
against a common enemy (Jones 2020).  
● [...] COVID-19 patients; the progress (or lack thereof) of these patients has been 
communicated daily with the public (Phuong Nguyen 2020).  
● Facebook posts on the government's official Facebook page (translated from 
Vietnamese with the Facebook translation tool):  
○ 4 MORE NEW COVID INQUESTIONS-19 (FROM FOREIGN) (May 16th 
2020): 
■ BN315: Male, 39 years old, from Cambodia to country and illegal entry 
through the trail at 15 pm on 2/5, 2/5, to the aunt's house in Tan Dong, 
Tan Thanh commune, Tan district Chau (Tay Ninh). 
■ BN316: Male, 19 years old, address in Da Nang city. On July 14/5, 14/5 
from Philippines to the country on QH9352, shortly after entry at Can 
Tho International Airport, was taken to quarantine right at Dong Thap 
Military School. 
■ BN317: Male, 29 years old, with address in Dien Khanh, Khanh Hoa. 
On July 13/5, 13/5, from Russian Federation to the country on 
VN00062, after entry at Van Don Airport was taken to quarantine right 
at Thai Binh Province Military School base 1. 
■ BN318: Female, 41 years old, with address in Thanh Hoa city, Thanh 
Hoa province. On July 13/5, 13/5, from Russian Federation to the 
country on VN00062, after entry of Van Don airport was taken to 
quarantine right at Thai Binh Provincial Military School base 1 (Thông 
tin Chính phủ 2020a). 
○ Reports from other countries (May 17th 2020): 
■ India overcomes China on COVID-19 cases 
■ Day 16/5 is the highest number of deaths in Russia since this country 
noted the first person to die of COVID-19 July 19/3. 
■ To ensure that all Italian people can buy a medical mask for 50 cent, 
Special Commissioner on Italy's emergency, Domenico Arcuri says it 
will increase supply up to 30 million masks and distribute to pharmacies 
nationwide. 
■ Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez on 16/5 says, this country 
government will seek new extension regarding emergency orders, 
according to this order will last "about 1 months" until the transition 
period unloading blockade is completed. 
■ In NYC, Mayor Bill de Blasio says beaches here will not be able to 
reopen by the end of May. NYC is even trying to alleviate crowds in 
parks, especially in Central Park. 
■ Korean Disease Prevention and Control Center announced that this 
country has recorded 19 SARS-CoV-2 virus infections, the lowest 
increase in the last week, when the last week Infection related to the 
outbreak in Itaewon night entertainment district, Seoul capital, has 
subsided (Thông tin Chính phủ 2020b). 
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○ Examples of Vietnam being celebrated for its pandemic response (May 18th 
2020): 
■ The well-known Australia-based 7NEWS Australia channel has recently 
taken over five minutes during its daily latest headlines to praise Viet 
Nam’s efforts on COVID-19 fight. 
■ The news is opened up by a question: “Do you know which countries 
have been the most successful in protecting its citizens from 
coronavirus…?” by the 7NEWS broadcaster. 
■ " Do you know which country is most successful in preventing COVID-
19 pandemic in the world?"-female MC leads the news of Australian 
famous TV channel-7 NEWS asking questions (Thông tin Chính phủ 
2020c). 
Communicating uncertainty (transparency) 
● Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Binh Minh 
proposed pursuing a balanced approach in fighting the epidemic and maintaining open 
economic policies, while ensuring regular updates were made available to the public 
(Vu & Tran 2020). 
● The government has positioned itself as an effective source of leadership during the 
pandemic by providing information with transparency (ibid). 
● By being transparent and proactive in communicating with the public, the government 
was able to gain and maintain public confidence (Vu & Tran 2020). 
● Dr Pollack says the government did "a really good job of communicating to the public" 
why what it was doing was necessary (Jones 2020). 
● In the social domain, during the early days after the first infected case, there had been 
rumors that the Vietnamese government was hiding information about the novel 
coronavirus, which caused some confusion and insecurity for the public. To respond to 
this information, the authorities and mainstream media promptly reassured the citizens 
that transparency is the fundamental principle of the country in preventing the spread 
of the virus. Government officials further explained that data and information from four 
Public Health Emergency Operation Centers of Vietnam were directly connected to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention USA and, therefore, shared openly to the 
global database (La et al. 2020, p.17).  
● Early, decisive and transparent actions by the country’s leadership, along with the 
engagement and solidarity of citizens, have been key to Vietnam’s success in combating 
COVID-19 to date (Le, 2020).  
Community engagement (compliance) 
● Public compliance with precaution measures, including social distancing, is high. 
Wearing face masks is mandated in public places, and alcohol-based hand sanitizers are 
widely available (Le 2020). 
● The government and population are very, very used to dealing with infectious diseases 
and are respectful of them, probably far more so than wealthier countries. They know 
how to respond to these things (Jones 2020). 
● It gave the sense of "society working together to defeat the enemy", says Dr Pollack 
(ibid). 
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● While Vietnam's authoritarian government is well used to demanding compliance, Dr 
Pollack says the public largely rallied behind the government because they "saw that 
they were doing everything they could do and having success, and doing whatever it 
cost to protect the population" (ibid). 
● Enforcing social distancing and quarantine relied on its entrenched system of "loyal 
neighbourhood party cadres spying on area residents and reporting to superiors", says 
Phil Robertson of Human Rights Watch (ibid). 
● On social media, images and quotes of Deputy PM Dam appeared extensively on 
citizen’s posts, which created a sense of solidarity and the belief in government's’ 
efforts. Recently, the call from Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phúc on the whole 
nation’s joint efforts in COVID-19 combat attracted public attention and support from 
individual citizens (Le et al. 2020, p. 17). 
Inequality & access 
- 
Adaption to a diverse public  
- 
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